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As institutional and professional journalism faces increasing uncertainty about its 
financial security and social influence, it is also being challenged by emerging forms of 
networked journalism that rely on open, network-based flows of information. In 2010, 
one of those networked groups, WikiLeaks, rose to prominence through a series of large, 
high-profile leaks of government information. Drawing on the concepts of paradigm 
repair and professional boundary work, this study examined the way numerous 
professional news organizations portrayed WikiLeaks as being beyond the bounds of 
professional journalism. 
Through a textual analysis of discourse about WikiLeaks from the group’s 
inception in 2006 through early 2011, the study found that the American professional 
news media depicted WikiLeaks as unreliable, unstable deviants who maliciously and 
indiscriminately released information rather than properly performing journalism. The 
discourse portrayed WikiLeaks as being outside journalism’s professional norms in four 
primary areas: institutionality, reporter-source relationships, original reporting, and 
objectivity. In doing so, professional journalists defended those domains against 
 vii 
WikiLeaks’ networked alternative, reasserting their own social value and authority by 
arguing for the superiority of their professional journalistic model. Discourse from 
professional media criticism, conservative and liberal alternative news media, and 
European journalism was also examined, using the response to WikiLeaks to help form a 
a map of several areas of the journalistic sphere in terms of their adherence to the 
paradigmatic tenets of professional journalism. The WikiLeaks case provides a useful 
guide for evaluating future interactions between professional and networked journalism, 
particularly professional journalism’s evolving self-definition vis-à-vis its emerging 
networked counterpart. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
On July 25, 2010, the transparency activist group WikiLeaks made public one of 
the largest intelligence leaks in American military history, releasing about 77,000 pages 
of internal U.S. military documents from the war in Afghanistan. In an unprecedented 
arrangement, three news organizations, the New York Times of the United States, 
Britain’s Guardian, and Germany’s Der Spiegel, were given a few weeks to peruse the 
documents, add context with their own reporting, and publish their reports as a shared 
exclusive to coincide with WikiLeaks’ public release (Davies, 2010). 
For the Times, the “war log” report led off the front page on a Sunday, and formed 
the centerpiece of a stylized multimedia package online. (“The war logs,” n.d.). But when 
addressing WikiLeaks over the following six months, Times executive editor Bill Keller 
belittled it and took pains to separate the Times from it, rather than praising the 
organization that gave his newspaper arguably its biggest scoop in 2010. He chastised the 
group for its “glib antipathy toward the United States” (Keller, 2011a, para. 68), 
characterized its leader, Julian Assange, as “arrogant, thin-skinned, conspiratorial and 
oddly credulous” (para. 11), and repeatedly emphasized the Times’ independence from 
WikiLeaks (Brisbane, 2010; Folkenflik, 2010; “The war logs articles,” 2010). 
This might seem like an oddly belligerent way for a news editor to talk about an 
important source or collaborator, particularly in public. But Keller’s comments were not 
simply the product of eccentricity or personal distaste; instead, they were part of an effort 
to marginalize WikiLeaks in order to bolster the Times’ own status as an elite standard-
bearer of modern journalism. This aim was likely not a conscious, explicit one for Keller, 
but it was illustrative of a larger coolness toward WikiLeaks among the Times and other 
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traditional media organizations during late 2010 and early 2011 as WikiLeaks ascended 
to public prominence through a series of increasingly disruptive intelligence leaks. 
The connection between these two sides of those organizations’ discourse—the 
politics of self-justification and the ostracism of WikiLeaks—is what this study aims to 
explore: Why did the New York Times and other news organizations feel the need to 
distance itself from WikiLeaks in order to preserve their own authority, even as they 
relied on the group for information? In what specific ways did they portray WikiLeaks as 
being deviant or inferior? And what does that tell us about the way the traditional news 
media conceive of themselves as a profession? 
This study has WikiLeaks as its topic, but its primary aim is not to gain 
understanding about WikiLeaks. Rather, its intent is to explore the response to WikiLeaks 
from media in a variety of spheres, from professional journalism to media criticism to 
liberal and conservative alternative media. By doing so, I hope to explain how and why 
news organizations distanced themselves from WikiLeaks, and in particular, what that 
discourse can reveal about the ways those news organizations see themselves vis-à-vis 
the ascendant form of networked journalism that WikiLeaks embodies. With its globally 
decentralized structure, blend of advocacy and journalism, and belief in the power of 
unfettered flows of information, WikiLeaks is one of the world’s most prominent 
practitioners of networked journalism, a broadly based model that shifts the gathering and 
dissemination of information from more linear, institutional processes to open flows 
based in less hierarchical networks (Anderson, forthcoming; Beckett & Ball, 2012; 
Benkler, 2011). The professional news media exist in uneasy tension with this networked 
journalistic model, with some professional journalists embracing many aspects of it 
(Paton, 2011; Rusbridger, 2012) and others—sometimes within the same news 
organizations—resisting it (Applebaum, 2010a; Keller, 2011b). Other works have 
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examined this tension from within newsrooms themselves (e.g., Paterson & Domingo, 
2008), but this study will do so through an exploration of journalists’ public discourse 
regarding a prominent networked journalistic actor. The discourse about WikiLeaks 
among journalists can help illuminate their views not only of network journalism itself, 
but also of professional journalism’s relationship to it, including its distinctions, 
similarities, and convergences. 
Two theoretical concepts derived from the sociology of science are particularly 
useful in that pursuit—paradigm repair and boundary work. Both concepts describe 
processes by which journalists and other professions reinforce their own social authority 
when confronted with actors or neighboring institutions that they perceive as threats, just 
as WikiLeaks was perceived in this case. The two processes are quite similar, but arise 
from different theoretical roots and manifest themselves in slightly different fashion. The 
following section will introduce and describe both paradigm repair and boundary work, 
then briefly explore how the two processes might interact. 
PARADIGM REPAIR 
Paradigm repair is rooted in the constructivist idea that certain groups develop a 
shared set of values that they use to create and organize knowledge, and also to define 
themselves and maintain their own authority. Those groups often respond to cases that 
challenge their values by portraying the actors involved in it as anomalous in order to 
distance themselves from the case and preserve their own collective authority. 
The research on paradigm repair stems from Kuhn’s concept of paradigms, which 
he defined in part as “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on 
shared by the members of a given community” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175). These paradigms 
take the form of accepted models or patterns that serve as the group’s guiding principles 
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in organizing and presenting information, allowing the group’s members to avoid having 
to continually re-examine their foundational principles and instead focus on developing 
higher-order concepts. Though they are occasionally expressed in explicit forms such as 
professional codes, paradigms are often unspoken, and often lack even an agreed-upon 
rationalization (Kuhn, 1970, p. 49). Because of this taken-for-granted status, paradigms 
function (often in tandem with professionalization) to limit their communities’ range of 
inquiry, closing off issues and alternative approaches that are not compatible with their 
form (Kuhn, 1970, p. 37). These limitations become part of the paradigms’ perceived 
status as social reality, which can lead them to become circular or self-referential 
(Bennett, Gressett, & Haltom, 1985) or self-contradicting (Reese, 1990) because they 
derive their authority from an idea of objective reality that is itself created by the 
paradigm. 
Paradigms are periodically confronted with anomalies—cases that share some 
characteristics of the larger paradigm but diverge in ways that challenge the paradigm 
itself, leaving the group with the option of either adjusting the paradigm to fit the case or 
casting it as entirely outside the paradigm in order to restore faith in the paradigm from 
both within and outside the group. Groups typically choose the latter (Bennett et al., 
1985; Hindman, 2003), in an attempt to defend not only the paradigm itself, but the 
“imagined collective subscription to this paradigm” (Berger, 2010, p. 226)—the illusion 
that the paradigm is universally accepted. The way they attempt this “repair work” 
(Tuchman, 1978) can reveal much about the nature of the paradigm and the community 
that holds it, especially the communal values they share and the dynamics by which they 
regulate them (Meyers, 2011, p. 262). No single case can reveal the whole of a paradigm, 
though a varying set of cases can help illuminate the contours of a particular paradigm 
(Bennett et al., 1985; Reese, 1990). 
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Journalism displays many of the characteristics of a paradigm-guided field. It is 
marked by many elements of professionalization, particularly in regard to its closely 
guarded professional training, and it is defined by a set of commonly held norms and 
routines (Becker & Vlad, 2009; Bennett et al., 1985; Singer, 2003). Like many 
paradigms, the journalistic paradigm reinforces hegemony by narrowing the potential 
range of frames for news stories and privileging the perspectives of powerful actors 
(Reese, 1990). The journalistic paradigm has commonly been conceived of as consisting 
of the principles of balance and objectivity—a descendant of empirical positivism 
(Hackett, 1984; Reese, 1990)—as well as hierarchical organizational structures, a shared 
identity professionalism, and, more recently, an animosity toward blogs and unsanctioned 
digital expressions of news (Carlson, 2012; McCoy, 2001; Ruggiero, 2004).  
The journalistic paradigm repair process has been well documented by scholars. 
The process is a ritual (Berkowitz & Eko, 2007) with two primarily performative 
dimensions: One, oriented toward the public, to argue for the validity of the paradigm, 
and the other to help define and reinforce the paradigm in order to reassure the members 
of the journalistic community itself (Berkowitz, 2000; Cecil, 2002). The means by which 
this is done fall into two general categories: journalists assert the value and effectiveness 
of the paradigm while distancing themselves from and minimizing the perceived threat, 
thus allowing them to both acknowledge the paradigmatic challenge and assert their 
superiority over it (Hindman, 2003; Reese, 1990). These strategies often play out in the 
opinion sections of news media content (Bicket & Wall, 2007; Cecil, 2002), though they 
can take place in news content as well, particularly for matters that do not directly 
involve objectivity (Handley, 2008). In both spaces, journalists often accomplish 
paradigm repair by using experts to affirm their own opinions (Bennett et al., 1985) and 
re-presenting their paradigms anew to audiences (Berkowitz & Eko, 2007). 
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As Carlson (2012) and Meyers (2011) point out, research on journalistic paradigm 
repair has typically been applied to individual cases where journalists deviate—often 
ethically—from the paradigmatic norms either unknowingly or surreptitiously. But 
journalists also act to defend themselves from more intentional, non-episodic challenges 
that offer viable alternatives or sustained threats to their paradigm (Carlson, 2012; 
Meyers, 2011). Meyers refers to these as “paradigmatic challenges,” while Carlson 
incorporates them into his concept of “second-order paradigm repair,” in which 
journalists generalize a single paradigmatic threat as broadly significant across the 
profession, rather than isolating it as deviant as often occurs in paradigm repair (Carlson, 
2012, p. 268). Carlson’s and Meyers’ reconceived notions of paradigm repair are 
particularly relevant to the case of WikiLeaks: The group is more characteristic of an 
ongoing paradigmatic challenge than a single deviant actor traditionally studied in 
paradigm repair. Unlike those actors, WikiLeaks portrays itself as trustworthy and 
presents a sustained challenge and viable networked alternative to the professional 
journalistic paradigm. The paradigm repair performed in this case is not second-order 
paradigm repair, because journalists still portrayed WikiLeaks as deviant and focused on 
it in particular as a threat rather than engaging in larger ideas about the profession. Still, it 
shares some commonalities with second-order repair, especially in that journalists are not 
responding to a public outcry, but instead trying to marshal public support for their cause 
(Carlson, 2012). 
BOUNDARY WORK 
Like paradigm repair, the concept of boundary work is based in the study of how 
scientists define their bodies of knowledge and attempt to protect their social authority. 
As conceived by Gieryn (1983), boundary work involves a field’s attribution of certain 
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characteristics to itself to create a social boundary between it and adjacent fields, 
typically as an attempt to assert the field’s autonomy and enlarge its material and social 
resources (Gieryn, 1983, p. 782). These boundaries give fields social power and the 
authority to define themselves and their ideas (Dahlgren, 1992; Gieryn & Figert, 1986) 
and help accelerate their professionalization (Bishop, 1999; Winch, 1997), though, as we 
will see in the case of WikiLeaks, they do not necessarily preclude collaboration between 
fields (Riesch, 2010). These boundaries are often indistinct and moving (Winch, 1997), 
so they can become sites for what Abbott calls “jurisdictional disputes” between 
neighboring professions (Abbott, 1988). 
When these disputes occur, journalists’ cultural authority is at risk of being 
“undermined by a blurring of distinctions between what they do and the work of other 
mass communicators” (Frank, 2003, p. 448). Boundary work is an attempt to re-establish 
these distinctions and re-assert professional journalism’s authority in the face of such 
threats. Gieryn (1983) identifies three primary goals behind boundary work: expanding 
authority to other realms, monopolizing authority in a given realm, and protecting a 
profession’s autonomy. The second of those goals—monopolizing social authority and 
resources—is most applicable to WikiLeaks’ case; in these situations, boundary work 
allows a profession to paint others as deviant outsiders (Gieryn, 1983, p. 792). If 
performed successfully, boundary work expels its target from the profession being 
maintained and deflects attention from the structural flaws in the profession that made the 
challenge possible (Winch, 1997). 
Within professional journalism, this definitional rhetoric is commonly exercised 
by insiders through public self-criticism, defining what journalism is or is not through 
dichotomous distinctions such as professional/amateur, responsible/irresponsible, and 
ethical/unethical (Winch, 1997, p. 155). This self-criticism is performed for public 
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consumption as part of the journalistic routine, with the goal to make differences between 
the profession and the target clear to observers (Bishop, 1999; Wall & Bicket, 2008). If 
the intended audience indicates its lack of interest in this definitional rhetoric through low 
ratings and page views or resists it through oppositional comments in online channels, the 
boundary work may appear staged, and the boundaries may seem like simulations and 
remain undefined (Bishop, 2004). 
CONNECTING PARADIGM REPAIR AND BOUNDARY WORK 
Paradigm repair and boundary work are substantially similar processes. Both 
involve distancing the profession from an actor deemed deviant in order to restore trust in 
the profession and reinforce its social authority. In many cases when the two concepts 
have been addressed in the same study, researchers have either used them 
interchangeably or made no appreciable distinction between them (Berkowitz & Eko, 
2007; Bicket & Wall, 2007; Meyers, 2011; Wall & Bicket, 2008). Frank (2003, p. 442) 
asserts that the two are indistinguishable to the extent that paradigm repair involves 
journalists making distinctions regarding whether work has been done according to 
professional norms, and Bishop (1999) uses language of boundary work throughout his 
study, then switches to a distinction between simulated and real paradigm repair to 
describe the case at hand in the conclusion. 
There are subtle but significant distinctions, however, to be made between the two 
concepts. While both concepts are readily applied to instances of direct criticism of 
journalistic institutions and ideologies, boundary work has been more relevant to the less-
explicit and more systemic challenges to the authority of the journalistic field, such as the 
blogosphere’s emergence as news sources (Carlson, 2007; Ruggiero & Winch, 2005) and, 
in this case, the implicit challenge of WikiLeaks’ networked journalism to professional 
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journalism’s more institutional form. This is because boundary work tends to arise from 
disputes over who has jurisdiction over contested cultural space—a more implicit and 
potentially greater threat than from the anomalies to which paradigm repair typically 
responds. The recent revisions of paradigm repair by Meyers (2011) and Carlson (2012) 
have helped expand the concept to address these more implicit challenges, but when 
compared in their fundamental forms, boundary work remains more suited toward such 
implicit challenges. 
The two concepts can, in fact, complement each other well in this case. Because 
WikiLeaks is not a single rogue actor but part of a competing, networked approach to 
journalism, boundary work does much of the work of distancing the threatening actor and 
fortifying the boundaries of the profession, while paradigm repair parries the direct 
criticism aimed at the paradigm as a result of WikiLeaks’ challenge. In this way, both 
concepts are parts of the same process, serving the same purpose—justifying and 
reinforcing norms of the journalistic profession in the face of perceived threats. 
THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTIC PARADIGM 
In order to examine the ways in which WikiLeaks presented a challenge to the 
dominant journalistic paradigm and how journalists defended their professional authority, 
an outline of the paradigm being challenged must first be drawn. While there are 
numerous dimensions to this paradigm—including such characteristics as a profit 
orientation, independence from advertisers, and the perception of breaking news as a 
valuable commodity—this study will examine the particular dimensions that were 
violated by WikiLeaks. These dimensions emerged out of the repair and boundary work 
discourse itself, as will be discussed in further detail in the methods section later in the 
following chapter. The three dimensions of the professional journalistic paradigm to be 
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examined here are institutionality, source-based reporting routines, original reporting, and 
objectivity. 
Institutionality 
Institutions are a central orienting element within bureaucratic society (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983); they are rules and procedures that help structure behavior, decision-
making, and values within realms of social life (Cook, 1998; North, 1990; Sparrow, 
1999), often being expressed and reinforced within formal organizations or sets of 
organizations (Tolbert, 1988; Zucker, 1988). Like paradigms themselves, institutions 
both reinforce their own authority and delimit the range of actions and decisions available 
to them (Sparrow, 1999). The characteristics of institutionality are evident in the 
professional news media, both on the organizational and the inter-organizational level: At 
the latter level, professional journalism exhibits a remarkable amount of homogeneity and 
isomorphism, both in the content it produces (Boczkowski, 2010; Franklin, 2011) and the 
practices and procedures that guide it (Cook, 1998; Lowrey & Woo, 2010). Professional 
news organizations also exert significant authority over other areas of the social order, 
including the political sphere and the public, primarily through their control over the 
information and narratives that help constitute public life (Sparrow, 1999; Robinson, 
2007). Journalists themselves have also often conceived of themselves as an institution, 
exhibiting a professional identity that draws on common ethical values and social roles 
(Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996). The organizational level is also 
an important dimension of journalism’s institutionality, as the organization is the primary 
site for the transmission of and socialization into these institutional values, both through 
hierarchical structures and individual relationships, such as the one between reporter and 
editor (Schudson, 1989; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Dunaway, 2011). 
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Digital and networked models of journalism have presented a significant 
challenge to the news media’s institutionality. The Internet has vastly broadened the pool 
of actors able to publish valuable information and gain social and cultural influence, 
diluting the news media’s institutional authority over those capabilities. Institutions are 
also resistant to technological change itself; their form lends itself to evolutionary change 
rather than the more revolutionary change occasioned by the rise of digital technologies 
(Robinson, 2007). The news media as an institution have followed this pattern, only 
adopting technological changes insofar as they do not radically disrupt established 
routines and norms (Hermida, 2009; O’Sullivan & Heinonen, 2008), and such adoptions 
have typically amounted only to skin-deep, temporary changes (Lowrey & Woo, 2010). 
journalists have repeatedly articulated this institutional resistance to change in their 
discourse about new media, portraying bloggers and online journalists in anti-
organizational terms, as individualists unaccountable for their views inhabiting an 
unchecked online space (Benkler, 2011; Carlson, 2007; Lowrey, 2006; Singer, 2003). 
Still, Anderson (forthcoming) found that institutions are necessary to the success of 
networked journalism, in their ability to form stable hubs for news networks and to direct 
significant resources toward technological innovation. 
Reporter-Source Relationships 
While institutionality is the primary driver of professional journalistic values on a 
macro level, the everyday form of the news is shaped most significantly by the 
interactions between journalists and their official sources. As Schudson (1989) 
memorably described it, “the story of journalism, on a day-to-day basis, is the story of 
interaction of reporters and officials” (p. 271). In part through its embeddedness in 
institutionality, this relationship helps shape the social reality in which journalists situate 
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their reports of the news. Journalists accept the administratively structured knowledge of 
their official sources and their beats as the reality against which news is interpreted 
(Ericson, Baranek, & Chan, 1989; Whitney & Ettema, 2003). At the core of journalist-
source relationships is a particular arrangement marked by mutual dependence, as each 
side offers exclusive access to resources that the other values—officials need publicity 
and influence, and reporters need a steady supply of “newsworthy” information (Bennett, 
2004; Blumler & Gurevitch, 1981; Sigal, 1973). The two groups also depend on one 
another to uphold their own legitimacy—journalists help construct sources’ legitimacy in 
the public’s imagination (Bennett, 2004), and sources give legitimacy to journalists’ 
reports, allowing them to cite information as facts without further investigation (Carlson, 
2009; Ericson et al., 1989). 
This symbiotic relationship produces and depends on what Blumler and Gurevitch 
(1981) called a “shared culture”—a set of common social values and role definitions, as 
if reporters and officials are “playing a game with more or less agreed-upon rules” (p. 
482). Through this shared culture built on mutual trust, the two groups act together to 
form a composite source, constructing authority and meaning together (Blumler & 
Gurevitch, 1981; Ericson et al., 1989). The shared culture certainly contains some 
conflict, as journalists and sources negotiate over the authority to shape it and over the 
particular roles they play (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1981; Ericson et al., 1989). But that day-
to-day conflict does not shake the general balance of power in the relationship, which 
remains disproportionately influenced by sources’ administrative culture (Berkowitz, 
1992; Larsson, 2002). This imbalance within the shared culture causes journalism’s 
institutional ideology to be substantially shaped by a group outside of the institution 
itself—official sources, typically within government and business. Because of that 
significant outside influence, individuals cannot fully share in the ideology while 
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rejecting a relationship with this outside group. The chief effect of the pervasiveness of 
this shared culture is that journalists report not on reality but on the cultural product of 
their interaction with sources, and the news is “not so much an account of what happened 
as it is a compilation of what officials say about what happened” (Whitney & Ettema, 
2003, p. 164). This makes newswork reactive, as journalists become dependent on their 
sources, even to their own competitive detriment within the profession (Reich, 2006; 
Franklin, 2011). 
The challenge of networked journalism is much less explicit to reporter-source 
relationships than it is to institutionality. Though some of the features of networked 
journalism—notably, hyperlinks—connect users directly to sources (Carlson & Franklin, 
2011; Coddington, 2011), many of the practitioners of online journalism who operate 
outside its professional boundaries simply have no competitive alternative to the 
authority conferred by this shared culture. Reich (2008) found that official sources do not 
typically perceive citizen journalism outlets as desirable forums in which to appear, 
leading citizen reporters to be shut out of routine reporter-source exchanges, such as press 
conferences, conference calls, and press releases (741). In lieu of those sources, citizen 
journalists expand their sources to broader range of non-officials and often go without 
human sources entirely (Reich, 2008). Although this is a means of obtaining greater 
source diversity—and bloggers have seen their distance from official sources of power as 
a mark of credibility (Wall, 2005)—reporting without a relationship with official sources 
is not a viable form of journalism within the professional journalistic paradigm.  
Original Reporting 
Another principal area of the journalistic paradigm violated by WikiLeaks 
concerns the work of journalism—the practices by which journalists process, reinforce, 
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and attempt to establish the credibility of the information they present to the public. 
Newswork has primarily been conceived through the lens of the everyday routines that 
journalists use to gather information and classify stories (Molotch & Lester, 1974; 
Schudson, 1982; Tuchman, 1973). These routines help standardize the news while also 
communicating ideology by providing the gloss of a professional and systematic process 
that helps support journalists’ cultural and epistemological authority (Eliasoph, 1988; 
Tuchman, 1972; Tuchman, 1978). Routines are the “cultural glue” that helps hold 
together mainstream journalists’ common paradigm and interpretive framework 
(Berkowitz, 2000, p. 140). 
But newswork goes deeper than routines into more specific epistemological 
practices that form the core of how journalists determine and present evidence for the 
“facticity” and legitimacy of their reports. As journalists themselves present it, those 
primary evidentiary practices fall under the umbrella of reporting, often called “boots-on-
the-ground reporting” (Anderson, 2011), “shoe-leather reporting” (Pavlik, 2000), or, as I 
will call it here, “original reporting” (Anderson, 2011). On this concept, I build on the 
work of Anderson (2010, 2011, forthcoming), who has outlined the concept of original 
reporting, examined journalists’ discourse surrounding it, and compared it to the work of 
online aggregation. Anderson characterizes original reporting as rotating around a “holy 
trinity” of news objects that constitute the forms of evidence most valued by journalists: 
observation, documents, and interviews (2010, p. 7). Observation is closely tied to the 
concept of eyewitnessing, in which physical presence confers authority to the journalist, 
both for the individual report itself and for the profession’s legitimacy in the public’s 
imagination (Zelizer, 2007). Documents have long held a particular evidentiary power in 
investigative journalism, helping give information weight by making it material 
(Anderson, 2010; Ettema & Glasser, 1998), though they are not used as often in actual 
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practice as their professed value might indicate (Sigal, 1973). Indeed, as we will see in 
the WikiLeaks case, documents’ evidentiary value to journalists has some sharp limits. 
Interviews’ value are tied up in the authority derived from the reporter-source 
relationship, outlined in the previous point; they are considered a valid and reliable means 
of obtaining the facts or proper interpretation of a situation as determined by an official 
source (Schudson, 1995). Binding up all of these practices is the routinized form in which 
they are undertaken, embedding the practices in a historical, professional context that 
both draws boundaries for the approved practices of journalism (Sigal, 1973) and 
provides authority to persuade both readers and other journalists “that reporters have 
done all they can to reveal the truth” (Broersma, 2010, p. 28).  
This concept of reporting holds a central place in paradigm of professional 
journalism as the core of professional newswork (Singer, 2003), and has become 
increasingly valorized within newsrooms as a way to invoke authority over other forms 
of newswork, particularly online aggregation (Anderson, forthcoming). Its importance 
within journalistic discourse—and the importance of its survival to democracy—have 
reached a taken-for-granted quality, to the point where it is rarely defined (Anderson, 
2011). But the practice of “original reporting” is in fact deeply flawed. Each one of its 
“holy trinity” is an incomplete and vulnerable form of evidence: Eyewitnessing has been 
plagued with credibility concerns, particularly in journalism, where there are no 
standardized procedures (Mortensen, 2011; Zelizer, 2007); documents’ materiality can 
lend them a misleading sense of objectivity (Anderson, 2010; Ettema & Glasser, 1998); 
and interviews are frequently used as a tool for official sources to co-opt routines for their 
ends (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1982; Ericson et al., 1989). Not only are the practices 
themselves fraught with difficulties, but they are practiced with declining frequency by 
journalists. Numerous studies have shown that because of the increased role of public 
 16 
relations and decreased resources among news organizations, much less of the newswork 
actually being practiced could be classified as “original reporting” (Franklin, 2011; 
Lewis, Williams, & Franklin, 2008a, 2008b; Quandt, 2008). Much more of it is 
characterized by monitoring, imitation, and gathering readily available information 
(Boczkowski, 2010), to the point where “any meaningful independent journalistic activity 
by the media is the exception rather than the rule” (Lewis, Williams, & Franklin, 2008a, 
p. 17). 
The concept of “original reporting” has been a particular point of contention in 
the rhetorical encounters between professional journalism and its networked counterpart, 
which relies on information collected from diffused networks rather than gathered 
through the work of individual journalists (Anderson, 2011; Beckett & Ball, 2012). 
Professional journalists often hold original reporting up as a superior form of newswork 
to online aggregation, one that separates professionals from amateurs and parasites 
(Anderson, 2011, forthcoming; Fenton & Witschge, 2010). Indeed, when non-
professionals have attempted to practice journalism according to these professional tenets 
of “original reporting,” they have often encountered difficulties, owing to their lack of 
training and institutional resources (Reich, 2008; Reich & Lahav, 2011). But after being 
defined in their earlier days by their lack of reporting (Halavais, 2002; Singer, 2003), 
more web-native forms of newswork, such as aggregation and blogging, are converging 
with professional newswork, with both practices involving pulling together facts, 
quotations, documents, analysis, and narrative (Anderson, 2011, p. 22; Rosenberg, 2009). 
Though the rhetorical gap between original reporting and the networked forms of 
newswork are great, the lines distinguishing the two in practice are blurry at best. 
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Objectivity 
Objectivity is perhaps the most well-established element of the modern 
professional journalistic paradigm. It has formed the foundation of numerous studies on 
paradigm repair and boundary work (Bennett, Gressett, & Haltom, 1985; Berkowitz, 
2000; Bishop, 1999; Cecil, 2002; Hackett, 1984; Reese, 1990), and has been posited as 
the fundamental value of the repair process itself (Berkowitz, 2000; Meyers, 2011). 
Objectivity plays a central role in American professional journalism: Scholars have 
described it the profession’s “chief occupational value” (Schudson, 2001, p. 149) and 
“supreme deity” (Mindich, 1998, p. 1). Like “original reporting,” it has taken on a self-
evident quality within the profession, becoming synonymous with “good journalism” 
itself (Carpentier & Trioen, 2010). Within that paradigm, the idea of objectivity holds 
that reporting should consist only of facts, unadorned by opinion or bias, and where facts 
cannot be obtained, truth can be most nearly discerned by portraying conflicting claims 
with equal weight (Schudson, 2001). It is thus rooted in a positivist epistemology, with an 
assumption that reality rests on knowable facts that can be conveyed by journalists 
(Hackett, 1984, 2008). Within this concept, journalists’ role is to serve as neutral 
transmitters of this opinion-free—or at least opinion-balanced—social reality, using such 
techniques as detachment, balance of competing truth claims, staying out of the story, and 
not interpreting it from an ideological perspective (Bennett et al., 1985; Hackett, 1984; 
Mindich, 1998; Reese, 1990).  
Objectivity functions to reinforce professional journalism’s social authority by 
asserting its autonomy and establishing its jurisdiction to control knowledge (Broersma, 
2010; Schudson, 2001; Schudson & Anderson, 2008). In actuality, then, objectivity in the 
American sense is a “strategic ritual” (Tuchman, 1972), a routinized reporting form 
meant to shield journalists from accusations of bias in order to maintain its legitimacy as 
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an information collector and disseminator (Schudson & Anderson, 2008). The value of 
objectivity has thus been regarded—at times by journalists themselves—as an impossible 
ideal (Carpentier & Trioen, 2010; Mindich, 1998; Schudson, 1978): News media 
unavoidably represent events “in ways which are not pregiven in the events themselves,” 
whether by prioritizing or deprioritizing actors and events, making reporting decisions 
based on culturally bound values, or being bound by language that cannot accurately 
transmit reality (Hackett, 1984, p. 234). Far from true objectivity, news coverage is in 
fact often supportive of existing authorities by uncritically examining the systems of 
power (Schudson 1978, 2001). 
This journalistic concept of strategic objectivity should not be confused with the 
more scientifically oriented concept of objectivity, which consists of testing hypotheses 
and claims through empirical processes, then using the results to form conclusions 
(Boudana, 2011; Ryan, 2009). While that form of objectivity can be found in journalism 
(Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001), it is quite different from the one being explored here: The 
strategic ritual of objectivity is designed not to ascertain truth as the scientific process is, 
but to preserve authority. In fact, the strategic form of objectivity is a barrier to the 
scientific form (Boudana, 2011). 
Objectivity is not the dominant value in networked journalism that it is in 
professional journalism. Instead, the online journalistic forms that have laid the 
foundation for networked journalism, such as blogs and multimedia, have been marked 
by passionate partisanship, personal expression, and inclusivity, as opposed to 
detachment (Deuze, 2005; Wall, 2005). More recently, transparency has emerged as an 
alternative journalistic value to objectivity (Beckett & Ball, 2012; Karlsson, 2010). 
journalists’ response to this difference in online contexts has been conflicted; at times, 
they have portrayed forms of online journalism as unobjective and therefore not credible 
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news sources (Bishop, 2004; Ruggiero, 2004), but they have also showed signs of 
opening up their objectivity norms to conform to the prevailing norms on the web, such 
as in their use of Twitter (Lasorsa, Lewis, & Holton, 2011). The negotiation over the 
value of objectivity and the proper ways to practice it are in a particular state of flux, as 
professional and networked journalism jockey for discursive space. 
Forming the Paradigm  
Each of these four elements—institutionality, reporter-source relationships, 
original reporting, and objectivity—is embedded and intertwined with the others to form 
the paradigmatic canopy under which American journalism operates. Together, they 
reinforce one another’s authority and constitute the foundation from which each of the 
others is practiced. Of these four elements, institutionality and objectivity play more 
fundamental, influencing roles, while original reporting and reporter-source relationships 
are more secondary, products of the influence of the previous two elements. News 
organizations’ institutional heft and concomitant social power help dictate the parameters 
of reporter-source relationships, and those relationships become so bound up in 
institutional meaning that they can at times become proxies for institutional interaction 
(Beckett & Ball, 2012; Berkowitz & TerKeurst, 1999; Davis, 2009). Likewise, objectivity 
directs journalists to official sources, identifying them as the authoritative sources of 
knowledge in a social area, and that resulting relationship undergirds the continued 
legitimacy of objectivity as a paradigm (Bennett, 2004; Carlson, 2009; Ericson et al., 
1989). Reporter-source relationships are closely related to original reporting—while 
original reporting addresses the work of journalism, reporter-source relationships refers 
to the dynamic interactions that occur in one area of that work. The latter takes on an 
outsized importance as journalists rely largely on official sources for information, 
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practicing a journalism of attribution rather than a journalism of independent verification 
(Carlson, 2009)—though the journalists themselves would consider such work part of 
original reporting. Original reporting also grounds and is grounded in objectivity. The 
routines that constitute it assure objective reporting practice, and objectivity is cited as 
the justification for journalism to maintain jurisdiction over reporting practices (Schudson 
& Anderson, 2008). 
This study is an effort to map the professional paradigm of American journalism 
as it encounters a distinctive practitioner of networked journalism; to that end, this 
paradigmatic description has focused on American journalism in particular. But this study 
also includes one of the foremost institutions in British journalism—the Guardian, which 
worked closely with WikiLeaks over about six months—in an effort to help triangulate 
the American journalistic paradigm by highlighting similarities and departures between 
the two groups’ paradigmatic discourse. The British journalistic paradigm shares some 
fundamental elements with its American counterpart, but the two diverge in important 
ways. British professional journalism has shown similar institutional and organizational 
characteristics to the American news media (Aldridge, 1998; Barnett & Gaber, 2001), 
and no differences have yet been noted in their conceptions of original reporting. 
The most significant divergence between the two paradigms is in objectivity. 
Schudson (2001) traced its rise within an exclusively American context, placing British 
journalism halfway between American objectivity and Europe’s interpretive tradition and 
describing it as fact-oriented but not fully objectivist. Likewise, Hampton (2008) found 
that while Reuters and the BBC had adopted an American-style objectivity, most of 
professional British journalism emphasized editorial independence and fairness instead of 
objectivity—qualities that were compatible with partisanship. When surveyed, British 
journalists have expressed an approach to the issue that places them within the same 
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paradigm as their fellow Western Europeans, rather than Americans (Donsbach & Klett, 
1993; Donsbach, 1995). It is this interpretive paradigm from which the Guardian 
operates, as it aims to become “the world’s leading liberal voice” (“The world’s leading 
liberal voice,” 2009). Another importance difference is in the relationship between 
journalists and government officials. The British relationship is generally characterized 
with more conflict and tension, though elements of mutual dependence and shared culture 
are evident in both countries (Barnett & Gaber, 2001; Deacon, 2004; McNair, 2004; 
Schlesinger, 2006). 
Each element of this paradigm encountered a unique challenge during 2010 and 
2011 in the form of WikiLeaks, which both collaborated with professional media 
organizations in groundbreaking ways and simultaneously violated each one of these 
paradigmatic elements in virtually every dimension of its existence: structure, organizing 
values, information gathering, information dissemination, and relationships to 
governments and media. The following chapter will take a closer look at WikiLeaks as an 
anomalous case, examining each of these dimensions and the ways in which WikiLeaks 
violated the professional journalistic paradigm through them. 
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Chapter 2: WikiLeaks as Anomalous Case 
In determining the paradigmatic qualities of American professional journalism 
vis-à-vis networked forms of journalism, this study examines the case of WikiLeaks as an 
emblematic example of the encounter between those two spheres. This chapter outlines 
the details of WikiLeaks as a particular case. In doing so, I will first detail WikiLeaks’ 
history, then describe its structure and funding, and its relationships with professional 
media organizations and governments. I will close with a brief outline of the ways in 
which WikiLeaks violates the professional journalistic paradigm and presents an 
anomalous case, as well as an argument for the value of studying WikiLeaks as a case. 
WikiLeaks is an internationally based nonprofit group dedicated to leaking 
sensitive documents. The group was founded in 2006 with a global group of hackers and 
transparency activists led by Julian Assange, an Australian former hacker. Assange, who 
turned 40 in 2011, spent the late 1980s and 1990s as a hacker, breaking into corporate 
and government mainframes and websites under the pseudonym Mendax. Assange had 
gained a degree of prominence among the Australian hacking community, particularly in 
Melbourne, where he was both a co-author of and subject of a book on the international 
hacking world, Underground: Tales of Hacking, Madness & Obsession on the Electronic 
Frontier. Assange’s time as a hacker effectively ended in 1996, when he was convicted 
of 24 counts of hacking and fined in Australian court in 1996, though he never served any 
time in prison (Leigh & Harding, 2011). He spent the next decade running a security 
consulting site, attending college, and developing several open-source software programs, 
including a deniable encryption system that would allow human rights activists who were 
being interrogated to give a password to a minimal amount of information, while the bulk 
of the information would remain encrypted (Leigh & Harding, 2011). 
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Assange’s idea for WikiLeaks originated as far back as 1999 but did not begin to 
take substantive shape until early 2006 (Burns & Somaiya, 2011; Leigh & Harding, 
2011). Assange registered the WikiLeaks.org domain name in October 2006 (Beckett & 
Ball, 2012), and, before the site went live, the group published its first documents later 
that year: a copy of a decision by Somali rebel leaders to assassinate leaders of the 
Somali government, which was posted along with a 17-page analysis of its meaning 
(Aftergood, 2007). The group’s second significant publication also pertained to Africa; a 
report on extensive corruption by former Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi that had 
been commissioned but never released by his successor received front-page play in the 
Guardian (Leigh & Harding, 2011). 
Later that year, WikiLeaks began to post its first documents related to the United 
States, including a list of U.S. military equipment in Iraq and a guide to dealing with 
military detainees. The most prominent of those early leaks was a 238-page 2004 
Standard Operating Procedures guide to the Guantánamo Bay naval base’s Camp Delta 
prison: Military officials called the document out of date but did not dispute its 
authenticity (Gilson, 2007b; MacAskill, 2007). The group received its first significant 
resistance from government and corporate officials early in 2008, after it published 
documents pertaining to possible money laundering and tax evasion through the Cayman 
Islands account of the Swiss bank Julius Baer and Trust. The bank filed suit, and a U.S. 
federal judge ordered WikiLeaks’ domain name registrar to block its web address. The 
case quickly drew the support of Internet free speech advocates such as the American 
Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the judge reversed the 
order after two weeks (Glater, 2008; Liptak & Stone, 2008). 
During 2008 and 2009, the scope of WikiLeaks’ publications began to broaden, 
both in topic and in impact. The group moved deeper into leaks revealing government 
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corruption and inner workings, publishing documents revealing that U.S. forces were 
permitted to pursue former members of Saddam Hussein’s regime into Iran and Syria 
during the Iraq War (Schmitt & Gordon, 2008), an early draft of an international treaty 
targeting copyright violation (Masnick, 2008), and a series of documents on the details 
and financing of post-election violence in Kenya (Domscheit-Berg, 2011). This publicly 
oriented work earned WikiLeaks several accolades, including Amnesty International’s 
New Media award and a Freedom of Expression award from the British magazine Index 
of Censorship (Benkler, 2011). At the same time, it also exposed more secrets from the 
private sector, including handbooks from the Church of Scientology, an application 
developer agreement for Apple’s iPhone, emails from former Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin’s 
private account, emails from East Anglia University scientists that spurred the so-called 
“Climategate” debate, and numerous fraternity rituals (Claburn, 2008; Domscheit-Berg, 
2011; McCullagh, 2009; Schor, 2008). 
In 2010, WikiLeaks returned to its previous focus on governments, this time 
centering on the United States. The group released just six sets of documents throughout 
the year. Two of them were relatively minor: a 2008 U.S. Department of Defense report 
on WikiLeaks itself, and internal city documents regarding a stampede at a German 
parade (Strom, 2010; “WikiLeaks releases documents,” 2010). But the other four were of 
unprecedented scope, both for WikiLeaks and, increasingly, for the world’s intelligence 
community. First, WikiLeaks released a 2007 video of an American helicopter shooting 
at and killing a group of Iraqi civilians that included a Reuters photographer and driver. 
The video, released in both full 38-minute and edited 17-minute versions, was titled 
“Collateral Murder” and published on a dedicated site, collateralmurder.com —
WikiLeaks’ most concerted and advocative presentation of a leak to that point (Cohen & 
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Stelter, 2010). The video remains an anomaly within WikiLeaks’ publications for its 
extensive packaging and contextualization (Beckett & Ball, 2012). 
The second leak was exponentially larger than anything WikiLeaks had 
previously published: a trove of U.S. military documents detailing the war in 
Afghanistan. The cache included about 92,000 documents, of which 77,000 were 
published in July 2010. The remainder were held back for further redaction of informants 
who might be in danger of retribution; it is unclear whether those 15,000 have been 
subsequently published by WikiLeaks (“Afghan War Diary,” 2010). The documents 
revealed a bleaker picture of the war than official accounts had indicated, including 
substantial aid for Afghan insurgents from Pakistan and the use of heat-seeking missiles 
against allied aircraft by the Taliban (Chivers et al., 2010). The third leak, published in 
October 2010, was similar to the second—a set of 391,000 U.S. military documents from 
the Iraq War, which, when cross-checked by the nonprofit group Iraq Body Count, 
revealed 15,000 more civilian deaths than had previously been estimated (Leigh & 
Harding, 2011). As will be discussed later in this chapter, WikiLeaks collaborated with 
several news organizations for the first time with the two leaks, working with the U.S.’ 
New York Times, Britain’s Guardian, and Germany’s Der Spiegel for the Afghan leak 
and adding France’s Le Monde, the Qatari television network Al Jazeera, and the British 
nonprofit Bureau of Investigative journalism (Oldroyd, 2010). 
The fourth leak was the largest in history—a set of 251,000 U.S. diplomatic 
cables, of which only 220 were initially released in November 2010. WikiLeaks 
gradually released several thousand others before the entire set of documents was 
inadvertently released online during the summer of 2011 and formally published by 
WikiLeaks in September 2011 (Gunter, 2011). The cables contained a vast array of 
diplomatic revelations pertaining to virtually every country in the world, including 
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terrorism funding by Saudi Arabia; systemic corruption in Afghanistan, Yemen and 
elsewhere; and directives to U.S. diplomats at the United Nations to spy on others there 
(Mitchell, 2011). This time, the leak was done in concert with the Guardian, Der Spiegel, 
Le Monde, and Spain’s El País, excluding the Times, which received the information 
from the Guardian (Leigh, 2010). 
Shortly after that diplomatic cables leak, Assange turned himself in to British 
police on Swedish accusations of rape and molestation stemming from an encounter with 
two Swedish women in the summer of 2010 (Burns & Somaiya, 2010b). He was granted 
bail a week later and remained under house arrest in Britain as of February 2012. He has 
spent much of the last year and a half fighting his extradition to Sweden; two lower 
judges have ruled in favor of extradition, and he has appealed the case to the British 
Supreme Court (Owen, 2012). WikiLeaks, meanwhile, has continued to operate despite 
Assange’s incarceration, though at a slower pace. In addition to its release of the 
remainder of the diplomatic cables, it made two leaks in 2011: a set of files related to 
detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and a set of files from international intelligence 
contractors it dubbed “The Spy Files.” The Guantánamo files were released in April 2011 
with eight mostly new media partners, which did not include the New York Times or 
Guardian, though both papers gained access to the files indirectly (Stelter & Cohen, 
2011). The Spy Files were released in November 2011 in conjunction with the Bureau of 
Investigative journalism and the London human rights group Privacy International 
(Chatterjee, 2011). 
WIKILEAKS’ STRUCTURE AND FUNDING 
WikiLeaks consists of a loose conglomerate of global activists without a stable 
organizational structure or formal headquarters. The group’s Twitter profile lists its 
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location as “Everywhere,” and it has operated at various Times out of Iceland, Britain, 
Germany, and Sweden, among other places (Domscheit-Berg, 2011). Rosen (2010) has 
described it as “the world’s first stateless news organization” (para. 14). Unlike all other 
news organizations, WikiLeaks is not organized under the laws of a particular nation but 
“under the logic of the Internet itself” (Rosen, 2011). This has given the organization the 
ability to protect its anonymous sources and stay beyond the reach of governments 
attempting to end its operations (Beckett & Ball, 2012; Fisher & Cohen, 2010; Leigh & 
Franklin, 2008). 
Likewise, the group’s structure is deliberately amorphous. Assange has been, by 
all accounts, the central figure in the group since its inception, though he has not referred 
to himself by a consistent title. The number of people reported to be involved with the 
organization has ranged widely, but various accounts have estimated the group at about a 
half-dozen members who could be considered “full-time,” along with several dozen core 
volunteers, and several hundred others who are more tangentially involved (Burns & 
Somaiya, 2010a; Cohen & Stelter, 2010; Domscheit-Berg, 2011; Khatchadourian, 2010). 
The group lists an advisory board on its site, though several of its members were reported 
in 2010 to be unaware that they were on it; Assange called the board at the time “pretty 
informal” (Kushner, 2010, para. 19). 
The site was originally intended to function as a wiki, allowing a large, distributed 
group of users to collaboratively upload, review, and disseminate leaked documents, 
though to avoid censorship, it would not be openly editable like most wikis (Gilson, 
2007a). Beginning in 2008, however, that model was scrapped in favor of releasing 
documents to journalists and publicly releasing them in conjunction with those 
journalists’ published reports based on the leaks (Singel, 2008a). Alongside many of its 
major leaks, WikiLeaks has released analyses of the information being published. In the 
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case of its Collateral Murder video, the group sent two Icelandic members to Iraq to talk 
to eyewitnesses and conduct background research (Beckett & Ball, 2012; Domscheit-
Berg, 2011). 
WikiLeaks’ funding sources and mechanisms have also been fluid. When the 
means of the groups funding were made broadly public for the first time by the Wall 
Street Journal in mid-2010, most of WikiLeaks’ funds were funneled through the Wau 
Holland Foundation, a German group named after a legendary hacker. WikiLeaks opened 
an account at the foundation in 2009 (Domscheit-Berg, 2011) and received funds from 
the account through a convoluted process in which other foundations would aggregate its 
bills and submit them to the foundation, which would then disperse the funds to 
WikiLeaks strictly in exchange for aggregated receipts. This method was used in order to 
keep WikiLeaks’ donors and the companies with which it worked hidden from potential 
retribution. Assange also claimed that WikiLeaks was registered as a library in Australia 
and a foundation in France, and had two 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations that acted as 
a front for the website (Whalen & Crawford, 2010). In 2010, WikiLeaks collected $1.8 
million through Wau Holland and spent about $550,000 of it (Burns, 2011), with most of 
the money coming from Germany (Domscheit-Berg, 2011). 
WikiLeaks also collected money through the online money-transferring service 
PayPal. WikiLeaks’ PayPal account was frozen for about three months in 2009 
(Domscheit-Berg, 2011), then shut down permanently in December 2010, in response to 
the release of the diplomatic cables (Burns, 2010). Other financial institutions such as 
Visa, Mastercard, and Western Union also refused to process donations to WikiLeaks, 
and in late 2011, the group temporarily suspended many of its operations because the 
blocks had cut off 95 percent of its funding, according to Assange (Burns, 2011). 
WikiLeaks has also opened accounts with the British money-transfer service 
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Moneybookers and the Swedish micropayment system Flattr, though its account with the 
former was shut down in mid-2010 (Butcher, 2010; Domscheit-Berg, 2011). It twice 
applied for a grant of about $500,000 from the Knight Foundation’s Knight News 
Challenge but was denied (Domscheit-Berg, 2011). 
WikiLeaks is not reported to have paid any formal salaries before 2010. 
According to Domscheit-Berg (2011), much of its primary members’ meager living 
expenses were paid for informally by others. By the end of 2010, however, a handful of 
WikiLeaks’ members were drawing salaries (Burns & Somaiya, 2011), and Wau 
Holland’s figures indicated that WikiLeaks paid out total salaries of about €100,000 per 
year, of which €66,000 went to Assange (Leigh & Harding, 2011). It is unclear how 
WikiLeaks spent the $1.3 million surplus it had at the end of 2010, though Assange and 
WikiLeaks have maintained they have not used WikiLeaks’ money to fight Assange’s 
sexual assault case (Burns, 2011). 
WIKILEAKS AND THE MEDIA 
WikiLeaks’ relationship with the professional media has always been an uneasy 
one, even more so since mid-2010, when it began positioning itself more closely to 
professional news organizations, both rhetorically and collaboratively. WikiLeaks had no 
substantive relationship with the mainstream news media before early 2010. It did not 
collaborate with any news organizations, and, with the prominent exception of numerous 
pieces including one long feature in the Guardian, it was not covered in any substantive 
way by major mainstream news organizations. Its first formal attempt to reach out to 
those organizations came in 2008, when it attempted to auction off exclusive initial 
publication rights of the emails of a top assistant to Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez; 
no bids came in (Domscheit-Berg, 2008). In explaining the plan, Assange articulated a 
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strategy that would guide WikiLeaks’ decisions to collaborate with media organizations 
on major leaks in 2010 and 2011. When WikiLeaks offered its information to everyone in 
unlimited supply, news organizations were unwilling to devote the resources to analyze 
or report on it without additional incentives. News organizations would show more 
interest, Assange reasoned, when given exclusive access to a story—a “scoop”— in 
return (Singel, 2008b). 
This was the philosophy that led WikiLeaks to collaborate with mainstream news 
organizations beginning in early 2010. The group began the shift by making a significant 
move toward traditional journalistic behavior with the Collateral Murder video, though 
without any collaborative relationships. (Though not for lack of trying—Assange met 
with the Guardian’s investigations editor, David Leigh, but was unable to reach a deal 
with him [Leigh & Harding, 2011].) In addition to the two members WikiLeaks sent to 
Iraq to do background reporting on the video, the group also edited the raw footage into a 
17-minute video, held a press conference and put the story on a dedicated site with a set 
of still images and a timeline (Hodge, 2010). 
WikiLeaks’ first successful collaboration with a mainstream news organization, 
however, was initiated by the news organization, not Assange. Nick Davies, one of the 
Guardian’s most prominent investigative reporters, made the first contact between the 
paper and WikiLeaks regarding a potential partnership, emailing Assange in June 2010 
after reading that U.S. army private Bradley Manning had allegedly leaked hundreds of 
thousands of diplomatic cables to WikiLeaks (Leigh & Harding, 2011). Though the paper 
had written on WikiLeaks with some regularity and Assange had previously met with 
Leigh, the group had no substantial relationship with the Guardian before that time. 
Assange had written to the Guardian’s editor, Alan Rusbridger, several times throughout 
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WikiLeaks’ first years, urging him to pick up WikiLeaks’ stories, though Rusbridger had 
never taken him up on an offer (Leigh & Harding, 2011). 
Davies eventually caught up with Assange and other WikiLeaks representatives in 
Brussels and reached an agreement with them to give his paper time to preview the 
Afghan War documents and write a series of stories on them to coincide with WikiLeaks’ 
publication (Leigh & Harding, 2011). He and another Guardian reporter suggested 
bringing in the New York Times and Der Spiegel, in large part, to help shield the 
Guardian from the possibility of an injunction. Both publications agreed, and Assange 
and reporters from the three organizations spent several weeks holed up at the 
Guardian’s offices poring through the documents (Keller, 2011a; Leigh & Harding, 
2011). A largely similar process was followed four months later for the Iraq War 
documents, and Le Monde, Al Jazeera and the Bureau of Investigative journalism were 
added to WikiLeaks’ partners, though Le Monde and Al Jazeera did not collaborate with 
the others in perusing the documents. The Bureau and Al Jazeera in particular upset its 
original collaborators; the Bureau’s plans to produce a documentary on WikiLeaks led 
Assange to delay publication and one of its journalists let plans of the publication slip, 
while Al Jazeera broke the news organizations’ agreed-upon embargo by about an hour 
(Leigh & Harding, 2011). 
WikiLeaks’ relationship with news organizations began to fray beyond repair 
shortly after the publication of the Iraq War documents, following the New York Times’ 
publication of an article that described Assange as a dictatorial leader and WikiLeaks as 
an organization on the verge of collapse (Burns & Somaiya, 2010a). Assange had also 
been upset by the Times’ refusal to link to WikiLeaks’ publication of the Afghan War 
documents, and after the Times’ critical story, Assange cut the paper out of the group of 
news organizations with which it shared its diplomatic cables (Keller, 2011a). The Times 
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received the cables from the Guardian; according to the Guardian, this infuriated 
Assange, leading him to threaten to sue the Guardian and cut off their access as well 
(Leigh & Harding, 2011). This time, WikiLeaks followed the news organizations’ lead in 
determining what cables to publish, initially releasing just 220 (Shane & Lehren, 2010). 
Though it resulted in an agreement for the diplomatic cables, the meeting at which 
Assange threatened to sue the Guardian turned out to be a significant event in the 
deterioration of WikiLeaks’ relationship with the paper. The Guardian’s Davies had been 
angry with WikiLeaks’ decision to give the Afghan War documents to the British TV 
network Channel 4 just before their publication in July (Leigh & Harding, 2011), and by 
February 2011 the paper was referring to itself as one of WikiLeaks’ “former 
collaborators” (P. Walker, 2011, para. 4).The animosity between the groups reached its 
high point in September 2011, after the diplomatic cables had been published in various 
places online. The Guardian had published the password to the encrypted cables file 
earlier that year in its book on WikiLeaks (Harding & Leigh, p. 139), and within a few 
months, web users began applying it to the file, which WikiLeaks supporters had made 
publicly available on the file-sharing site BitTorrent (Stöcker, 2011). Each side 
responded by blaming the other—WikiLeaks threatening a lawsuit for violation of 
confidentiality, and the Guardian saying its publication of the password was not a 
security compromise and that it was told the password was temporary (Gunter, 2011). 
Though WikiLeaks has worked with several other mainstream news 
organizations, including the Washington Post and McClatchy Newspapers, its 
relationships with organizations beyond the Guardian and the New York Times have not 
been widely documented. Neither have its relationships with alternative media 
organizations, with a few exceptions. Notably, it engaged with a brief spat with the 
liberal magazine Mother Jones in early 2010. The conflict began with the publication of a 
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freelance article that took a critical view of Assange and WikiLeaks; Assange responded 
by posting in the article’s comment section to accuse the piece of factual errors and 
“gutter journalism insinuations” (Assange, 2010a). Mother Jones’ editor accused 
Assange of rigging the comment system to give the comment a statistically impossible 
number of reader recommendations, and the two soon engaged in an angry confrontation 
at a journalism conference, with Mother Jones gleefully calling the conflict a 
“smackdown” (Gilson, 2010a; Gilson, 2010b). 
As a whole, WikiLeaks’ encounters with mainstream news organizations—
usually mediated through Assange—have been marked on both sides by deep distrust and 
slights, both perceived and real, borne out of competitiveness and personal pride. Both 
the relationships with the Guardian and the New York Times began with profound 
skepticism on Assange’s part, a phenomenon also experienced by more sympathetic 
contacts such as blogger and open government advocate Micah Sifry (2011a). And both 
relationships ended with testy meetings, followed by public denunciations of the other 
party. At first glance, the conflicts appear remarkably superficial and personal, but 
through a closer examination, I will argue that they are motivated by deeper, more 
fundamental contradictions. 
WIKILEAKS AND GOVERNMENT 
WikiLeaks’ relationship with government is far more universally antagonistic 
than its encounters with professional media, yet it, too, is not without some nuance. The 
philosophy behind WikiLeaks’ founding has been widely reported to be rooted in a belief 
of the illegitimacy of government secrets in particular and government power in general, 
and Assange’s own writings appear to support that. In a pair of online essays written 
around the time of the group’s founding, Assange referred to authoritarian governments 
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as conspiracies, “working in collaborative secrecy to the detriment of the people” 
(Assange, 2006b, para. 6). In this context, WikiLeaks’ aim was to make leaking 
government information easier and more widespread than ever, so that this government 
conspiracy would become so fearful of itself that it could no longer conspire (Assange, 
2006a, 2006b; Bady, 2010; Khatchadourian, 2010). 
In many senses, WikiLeaks has had no relationship at all with governments for 
much of its existence. As a stateless news organization, it is not organized under the 
auspices of any particular governmental body (Rosen, 2010, 2011), and its actual 
interactions with governments have been rare. The behavior between WikiLeaks and 
governments has taken the form of a cat-and-mouse pattern, without any direct 
interaction. WikiLeaks comes into possession of or publishes a set of government 
documents; government officials publicly denounce WikiLeaks’ behavior and urge it to 
cease; WikiLeaks publicly refuses the demands with a mocking or defiant tone; the 
government publicly reaffirms its desire to apprehend WikiLeaks’ principals; and 
WikiLeaks takes new steps to avoid apprehension. This process is nearly always carried 
out through media outlets, and it has most often taken place with the American 
government. 
The U.S. government has formally regarded WikiLeaks as a threat since shortly 
after it was launched; spurred by WikiLeaks’ 2007 release of Army documents and the 
Guantánamo Bay prison manual, the Pentagon produced a report in 2008 that declared 
the group a threat to Army information security (Strom, 2010). During WikiLeaks’ early 
years, other governments took more drastic, though temporary actions. The Australian 
government took WikiLeaks offline after it posted a list of banned sites there (Luft, 
2009a), and the British Ministry of Defence blocked it after it published military manuals 
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(Leigh, 2009). WikiLeaks was also briefly shut down by a U.S. federal judge in early 
2008, though the decision was quickly reversed (Glater, 2008). 
The U.S. government did not vocally condemn WikiLeaks itself after its 
publication of the Collateral Murder video—another news organization, Reuters, had, 
after all, also tried to gain access to it through the Freedom of Information Act. It began 
its publicly antagonistic rhetoric quietly in June 2010, following the arrest of Bradley 
Manning, with not-for-attribution statements expressing concern at the possible leak of 
the diplomatic cables and a desire for Assange’s “cooperation” (Shenon, 2010). The 
rhetoric sharply escalated once the Afghan War documents were published the following 
month, with concern turning to condemnation. That disapproval centered on WikiLeaks’ 
decision not to redact the names of local allied informants to prevent possible reprisal and 
was characterized by a statement by Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, that WikiLeaks “might already have on their hands the blood of some young 
soldier or that of an Afghan family” (Savage, 2010a, para. 12). 
In actuality, however, WikiLeaks had asked the government for assistance in 
identifying possible redactions. The two parties communicated through the New York 
Times. After the government gave the Times a request for WikiLeaks to redact the 
documents, Assange sent back a reply through the Times asking for help in doing so, 
which the government rejected and later denied receiving (Greenwald, 2010e). A similar 
process occurred before the publication of the diplomatic cables four months later, 
though without the Times’ involvement. Assange sent a request for redaction help to the 
U.S. government, was denied, and this time sent a reply stating that WikiLeaks did not 
intend to put anyone at risk, “nor do we wish to harm the national security of the United 
States” (Leigh & Harding 2011, p. 193). It was perhaps the most sympathetic statement 
Assange or WikiLeaks ever made toward the U.S. government. 
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The U.S. government repeated its accusatory rhetoric after the publication of both 
the Iraq War documents and diplomatic cables, attempting to maintain a delicate balance 
between condemning WikiLeaks’ revelations as dangerous and threatening to the world’s 
stability while at the same time downplaying their importance as a window into the 
machinations of American foreign policy. Meanwhile, it quietly acknowledged that it had 
no evidence of the war documents leading to anyone’s death (Youssef, 2010) and that the 
diplomatic consequences of the cable leak were modest (Leigh & Harding, 2011; 
Memmott, 2010). 
Republican officials and politicians, without the need to maintain that balance, 
were far more scathing in their language toward WikiLeaks. Top Republican 
congressman Peter King called for WikiLeaks to be designated a terrorist organization 
(M. O’Brien, 2010), and 2012 Republican presidential candidate Newt Gingrich said 
Assange should be considered an enemy combatant (Kleefeld, 2010), while former 
Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin urged the government to pursue 
Assange as it had the terrorist group Al Qaeda (Grier, 2010). 
WikiLeaks also faced denouncement from leaders of other nations, particularly 
for its publication of the diplomatic cables, though that rhetoric was less strident and less 
sustained than the United States’ (“Key reaction,” 2010; Rusbridger, 2011). In a few 
cases, leaders even voiced their support for WikiLeaks (Fick, 2010; Harding, 2010). 
Though WikiLeaks and Assange held an abiding skepticism for governments in 
general—particularly more authoritarian regimes like China—most of the hostility 
between it and governments manifested itself with the United States. 
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WHY STUDY WIKILEAKS? 
It has been widely argued over the past decade that traditional, professional media 
are facing a profound challenge from a networked form of media production that is built 
on an ethic of collaboration, amateurism, openness, niche interests, and widespread 
access to the tools of publishing and distribution—an ethic that directly contradicts the 
traditional media principles of professionalism, institutionalism, one-way 
communication, and narrow access to the tools needed to publish to a mass audience 
(e.g., Benkler, 2006; Bowman & Willis, 2003; Gillmor, 2004; Shirky, 2008). Traditional 
news organizations’ encounters with this nascent media model have been fraught with 
conflict, skepticism, and misunderstanding (Hermida & Thurman, 2008; Paterson & 
Domingo, 2008; Singer, 2003), but in some cases have also included significant steps 
toward adoption, collaboration, and incorporation (Hermida, 2009; Singer et al., 2011). 
The interaction between these two journalistic models and mindsets, and particularly how 
they shape one another’s values, norms, and practices, will play a significant role in 
defining the contours of journalism and news media as they move deeper into the 
networked era. 
As Benkler (2011) effectively argues, WikiLeaks embodies virtually all of the 
characteristics of this emerging model of media and journalism—what Benkler terms 
“the networked fourth estate.” Like many of the other blogs and nonprofits that make up 
this sphere, it is focused on enabling transparency by unearthing direct evidence of 
government behavior in order to allow a networked base of experts to analyze it and 
subject it to public criticism (Benkler, 2011, p. 55; Sifry, 2011a). Like many of the web’s 
most significant initiatives going back to its early days, it consists a decentralized, global 
network of contributors outside of a strictly institutional framework (Beckett & Ball, 
2012; Benkler, 2011; Rosen, 2011). And like public affairs blogs and other online news 
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organizations, it openly proclaims a point of view, publishing information and 
commentary toward an expressed political aim of challenging secrecy and promoting 
social justice (Beckett & Ball, 2012; Benkler, 2011; Wall, 2005). 
WikiLeaks violates each of the elements of the professional journalistic paradigm 
discussed in the previous chapter. First, it defies institutional characterization with its 
fluidity, both geographically and organizationally. It has no physical headquarters, and 
Assange spent most of 2010 without a permanent residence. Neither its membership nor 
organizational structure has an established form, being constituted instead by a loose, 
internationally diffused and continually changing collection of activists and collaborators. 
Likewise, its funding has come through a variety of non-institutional channels—and 
those funding institutions it has worked with have invariably cut off its access at one 
point or another. It even challenges alternative forms of media institutionality, lacking a 
board of directors, many of the formal structures that go with nonprofit ownership, and 
accountability structures such as annual reports (Beckett & Ball, 2012). 
Additionally, WikiLeaks engages in few, if any, of the source relationships and 
routines that traditional journalists use to validate original reporting and define 
themselves. It has almost no relationship with the official sources with which mainstream 
journalists share a culture. Instead, U.S. government officials from both parties have 
repeatedly condemned its actions, and major corporations—particularly financial ones—
have denounced it as well. (Bradley Manning, the person believed to have been the 
source of WikiLeaks’ major leaks, was not a well-placed government source, but a low-
level Army private.) Beyond that, its leaks have challenged the “settlement of power 
between media and politicians as a mutually responsible process” (Beckett & Ball, 2012, 
p. 9). Likewise, it operates outside the legal and political structures of any country, which 
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both professional and alternative news organizations have almost universally operated 
under (Beckett & Ball, 2012; Rosen, 2011). 
WikiLeaks’ engagement in the practices of “original reporting” is a much less 
clear paradigmatic challenge. Like journalists, WikiLeaks places a heavy faith in the role 
of documents in journalistic veracity, and it also sent members to perform “boots on the 
ground” reporting on at least one significant occasion. Yet here, too, WikiLeaks had no 
reporting beats or interviews with officials, spent no time navigating the bureaucratic 
systems of government, and had not witnessed the events about which they released 
documents. Its editorial and verification process is an ad hoc one, lacking many of the 
checks and balances and routinized processes that constitute the reporting and editing of 
information in professional news organizations (Beckett & Ball, 2012). 
And finally, contrary to the norm of objectivity, WikiLeaks and Assange have 
expressed explicit political goals through their leaks; not simply government 
transparency—a goal that many journalists affirm as compatible with an objectivist 
viewpoint—but exposing wrongdoing by the U.S. and other governments, and even 
undermining the authority of government itself (Assange, 2006; Bady, 2010; Cohen & 
Stelter, 2010; Khatchadourian, 2010). Interestingly, Assange himself claimed to adhere to 
a scientific form of objectivity, declaring that “journalism should be more like science” 
and that “as far as possible, facts should be verifiable” (Moss, 2010, para. 3). Yet as I 
noted in the previous chapter, this form of objectivity in which facts are verified through 
an objective process in order to draw conclusions shares some of the same philosophical 
roots with its journalistic counterpart, but is at many points incompatible with the 
journalistic practice of objectivity as strategic ritual. 
Yet despite this deviance from the professional journalistic paradigm, WikiLeaks’ 
core activities—gaining access to closely guarded information about important issues in 
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the public interest, then publishing it—have traditionally been thought of as journalistic 
in nature (Benkler, 2011; Greenslade, 2010a). This presents traditional journalists with a 
potentially problematic anomaly, one that performs what they have long perceived as a 
core duty of their profession, but one that also flouts several important aspects of their 
professional paradigm in the process. 
Not only does WikiLeaks embody all of these paradigm-violating characteristics 
of networked journalism, but it has also been one of the most prominent organizations to 
do so thus far. WikiLeaks was one of the most intensely covered topics in the United 
States in late 2010, both in online and traditional news media (Jurkowitz, 2010; 
“WikiLeaks prove wickedly popular,” 2010). The attention was deserved; by 
orchestrating the three largest leaks in modern intelligence history, WikiLeaks published 
a wealth of information that traditional media sources valued highly, but had been unable 
to directly uncover themselves. Clay Shirky’s claim that WikiLeaks “has had more 
scoops in 3 years than The Washington Post has had in 30” (2010) is surely hyperbolic, 
but it underscores the value and magnitude of the information WikiLeaks published, even 
within the institutions it threatened. 
WikiLeaks is not a perfectly representative embodiment of the networked fourth 
estate, nor should it be analyzed as such. In many of the aforementioned characteristics in 
which WikiLeaks embodies the values of networked journalism, it also manifests those 
qualities to an extreme degree. It is more decentralized and organizationally amorphous 
than many of its fellow journalistically oriented networked groups, such as Ushahidi and 
Spot.Us (though not to the degree of other web-based groups like Anonymous), and 
further onto the edges of the political/ideological spectrum than many of those groups as 
well. Like any group, WikiLeaks occupies a particular political and ideological 
location—in its case, one distinctively influenced by the principles of hacking culture of 
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the 1980s and 1990s and a strong strain of anti-authoritarianism, with elements of 
anarchism (Assange, 2006a, 2006b; Arthur, 2010; Bady, 2010; Leigh & Harding, 2011). 
And like any group’s ideological location, WikiLeaks’ cannot be used to generalize to an 
extraordinarily broad-based phenomenon with diverse backgrounds, motivations, values, 
and practices.  
Nevertheless, WikiLeaks presents an especially rich case for study of the 
interaction between the traditional and networked journalistic spheres because it 
interacted in such a direct, extended, and nuanced way with traditional media 
organizations, eliciting an exceptionally voluminous and textured corpus of discourse 
from within both spheres. It is for this reason, in addition to those articulated above, that 
this study centers on WikiLeaks in particular. 
The responses of the professional news media to WikiLeaks were especially rich, 
conflicted, and illustrative. Through the processes of boundary work and paradigm repair, 
those news organizations used WikiLeaks as an important symbolic battleground upon 
which to defend the values of institutionality, reporter-source relationships, original 
reporting, and objectivity. By distancing themselves from WikiLeaks in those areas, they 
sought to publicly define their journalistic practices in opposition to WikiLeaks’ 
networked characteristics, providing an illuminating glimpse into professional 
journalism’s self-conception in relation to a challenge posed by networked journalism. 
The following chapter outlines the method of textual analysis by which the journalistic 
discourse surrounding WikiLeaks was examined. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
In order to study the ways in which professional news media conducted paradigm 
repair and boundary work regarding WikiLeaks, this study employed textual analysis of 
the discourse about WikiLeaks produced by a broad range of news media sources. 
Qualitative textual analysis has been by far the most widely used form of data analysis in 
paradigm repair and boundary work studies (e.g., Berkowitz, 2000; Bicket & Wall, 2007; 
Bishop, 1999, 2004; Hindman, 2003; Reese, 1990) because those processes involve 
giving meaning to an event or actor through public discourse (Carlson, 2012), and textual 
analysis allows researchers to uncover and examine the latent values of a text that 
produce these meanings. 
The textual analysis for this study was guided by a process called ethnographic 
content analysis, which aims to achieve validity and rigor in textual analysis by 
examining key texts multiple times and by inductively generating and categorizing 
themes that emerge. In ethnographic content analysis, the goal “is to be systematic and 
analytic but not rigid” (Altheide, 1996, p. 16). Themes and categories guide the initial 
examination of the data, but additional themes are expected to emerge throughout the 
process of analysis. Ethnographic content analysis is similar to grounded-theory 
approaches in that both aim for clear description and classification of emergent themes 
and involve movement back and forth between theory and text, but grounded theory is 
more explicitly oriented toward theory building, while ethnographic content analysis is 
more descriptively and definitionally oriented (Altheide, 1996). 
The goal of this study was to map the contours of the American journalistic 
paradigm by examining actors from a variety of locations within and around it, including 
traditional professional news organizations, institutional publications of media criticism, 
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and alternative journalistic outlets, both liberal and conservative. Through this varied 
sample selection, comparisons are able to be made within categories and groups between 
both typical cases and those at several extremes, allowing for a fuller picture of the 
discursive area being studied (Altheide, 1996). 
To achieve this variety of key symbolic actors, what Altheide (1996) calls 
“theoretical sampling” was employed (See Table 1). Sampling was conceptualized in a 
series of concentric circles, starting with the New York Times at the center because of its 
unique place of influence within the American journalistic paradigm (Golan, 2006; Reese 
& Danielian, 1989) and because of its working relationship with WikiLeaks that was 
unique among American news organizations. Next, a set of influential news organizations 
within American professional journalism was chosen, with representations of various 
forms of media—print (the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal), television (CNN), 
and radio (NPR). These organizations were chosen for their influence and, particularly in 
the case of CNN, for its place near the center of the American journalistic spectrum 
regarding objectivity, as opposed to the more partisan approaches of Fox News and 
MSNBC. 
The next level of sampling took place within professional media criticism—a 
group of organizations that examine and critique American professional journalism from 
a place partially or wholly within the professional paradigm itself. The country’s two 
most prominent journalism reviews, the Columbia Journalism Review and the American 
Journalism Review, were included, as well as two professionally oriented online 
journalism criticism publications, the Online Journalism Review, run by the Knight 
Digital Media Center at the University of Southern California and the University of 
California at Berkeley, and MediaShift, run by the public television network PBS. Next, a 
set of alternative journalism sources was chosen: These sources were chosen because 
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they shared some characteristics with traditional professional news organizations—a mix 
of reportage and opinion, and an institutional or quasi-institutional location—in order to 
make more revealing comparisons with those professional news organizations. Among 
liberal organizations, the magazines The Nation and Mother Jones as well as the online 
magazine Salon and the blog group Talking Points Memo were chosen; among 
conservative organizations, the sites the Daily Caller (founded by conservative 
commentator Tucker Carlson), and Big Government and Big Journalism (founded by 
conservative digital media entrepreneur Andrew Breitbart) were chosen. Though it does 
no traditional reportage, the conservative aggregator Drudge Report was also included 
because of its outsized influence in online news coverage (Sappell, 2007; Weiss, 2007). 
Finally, the British newspaper the Guardian was chosen as a non-American news 
organization to aid in calibrating the American journalistic paradigm: It was chosen 
because of its relationship with WikiLeaks and its influence in that country and globally 
(Schlesinger, 2006). 
Next, a sample of texts about WikiLeaks was chosen from each of those 
organizations. The time frame used went from WikiLeaks’ origin in October 2006 
through April 30, 2011, just after the release of the Guantánamo Files, the last major 
WikiLeaks release at the time the sample was drawn (October through December 2011). 
In order to capture as many of the texts from that time period as possible, several sources 
were used, including each site’s archives, the Google News Archive, and the Factiva 
online database. In each case, the words “WikiLeaks” and/or “Assange” were the primary 
search terms used. Any type of content from each organization’s site was considered, 
including news articles, columns, editorials, letters to the editor, videos, podcasts, 
transcripts, and blog posts. (The exception was CNN, which only included transcripts of 
on-air discourse about WikiLeaks or Assange.) Because paradigm repair and boundary 
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work processes center on the deviant actor itself, only content that contained substantive 
statements about WikiLeaks itself was included. Texts that were about the contents of 
WikiLeaks’ releases with only a passing reference to WikiLeaks itself were thus not 
included. Content that dealt substantively with Bradley Manning, WikiLeaks’ alleged 
source for its major leaks of 2010, was also included, though it rarely yielded significant 
discourse about WikiLeaks itself. 
These sampling methods yielded a large pool of content, which is detailed and 
categorized in Table 1. It is important to note that this type of analysis cannot reveal the 
internal disputes that surely occurred at each organization regarding WikiLeaks and how 
it should be characterized, though some conflicting texts hint at some disagreement. 
While each organization produces other forms of discourse, including employees’ Twitter 
accounts and executives’ comments in other official channels, examining all of the 
material published under the organizations’ official auspices is sufficient to provide a 
general understanding of their public discourse. 
The sample pool from each organization—particularly the largest news 
organizations—is quite large for textual analysis, though not unprecedented (e.g., 
Carlson, 2012). Each piece of content within the sample was examined, though within 
each organization’s sample, a group of texts that contained more extensive discourse 
regarding WikiLeaks was informally identified and examined at more length; these are 
also listed in Table 1. Because an institution’s discursive rhetoric can take on different 
meanings depending on its location within the organization, texts were labeled by their 
type of content and author. Texts that were labeled as opinion and texts written by 
individuals near the center of the organization (i.e. editors, as opposed to contributors 
from outside the organization) were given special attention because paradigm repair and 
 46 
boundary work often come most strongly from those sources (Bicket & Wall, 2007; 
Cecil, 2002). 
 
Table 1: Discourse Examined for Study 
 
         Organization Name               Medium             Total Texts  In-Depth Texts  
                                                                                      (Approx.) 
 
Professional media, WikiLeaks relationship 
New York Times                           Newspaper/Website        155               35 
 
Professional media 
Washington Post                          Newspaper/Website        109               15 
Wall Street Journal                      Newspaper/Website        145               20 
CNN                                            TV                                    280*             45 
NPR                                             Radio/Website                 164               20 
 
Professional media criticism 
Columbia Journalism Review      Magazine/Website            69               10 
American Journalism Review      Magazine/Website              5                 5 
Online Journalism Review          Website                               2                 2 
PBS MediaShift                           Website                             11                 6 
 
Alternative media – liberal 
The Nation                                   Magazine/Website          239               10 
Salon                                            Website                           122               15 
Mother Jones                               Magazine/Website            59                 7 
Talking Points Memo                  Blog Network                   68                 4 
 
Alternative media –conservative 
Daily Caller                                 Website                             70                 5 
Big Government/Big Journalism Blog Network                   34                 8 
Drudge Report                              Aggregator                     151                 0 
 
British professional media, WikiLeaks relationship 
Guardian                                      Newspaper/Website       558**            45 
*Each text is a one-hour on-air transcript. 
**Includes texts from the Observer, the Guardian’s weekly sister paper which shares its website. 
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Potential themes were identified before analysis began through a review of 
relevant literature; discourse was classified and organized within each organization 
according to these themes, then combined and compared once initial analysis was 
complete, consistent with the thematic analysis techniques prescribed by Altheide (1996) 
and Patton (1990). One of the themes, original reporting, emerged inductively from the 
texts during analysis. After relevant literature regarding that theme was analyzed to help 
identify and clarify it, texts identified with that theme were re-examined. 
It is important to note that the purpose of this research method is not to evaluate 
the veracity of these organizations’ characterizations of WikiLeaks; it is instead to 
examine the nature of the discourse itself. As outlined in the previous chapter, WikiLeaks 
has indeed exhibited behavior that could be reasonably characterized as unstable, 
eccentric, or erratic, including infighting among members, dramatic shifts in operation, 
and suspicion of its collaborators (e.g., Beckett & Ball, 2012; Domscheit-Berg, 2011; 
Rusbridger, 2011); however, this does not preclude the existence of paradigm repair and 
boundary maintenance in news organizations’ description of it, or their use of it to 
position their own professional location. This behavior is just one of many aspects for 
news organizations to emphasize when covering WikiLeaks, and there are a number of 
possible interpretations for them to take from it. This study examines the emphases and 
interpretations of these organizations in particular. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
The broad corpus of textual discourse examined in the professional media, 
alternative media, and media criticism constituted a rich and complex body of paradigm 
repair and boundary work. As a whole, the discourse characterized WikiLeaks with 
growing concern and derision beginning with its first major release in April 2010 
(“Collateral Murder”) and peaking in December 2010 with Assange’s arrest shortly after 
WikiLeaks’ release of the diplomatic cables. The discourse’s path was shaped by three 
temporal turning points, all in 2010. First, the release of the Afghanistan war logs in July 
2010 centered discourse around a concern about WikiLeaks’ revelation of the identities 
of allied informants there. Second, the release of the diplomatic cables in November 2010 
thrust WikiLeaks to the forefront of the news media’s attention, calcifying the opposition 
toward that had been building over the previous several months. And third, Assange’s 
release on bail and placement under house arrest on December 14, 2010, signaled the 
formal denouement of the WikiLeaks story for the professional media. Subsequent 
coverage slowed dramatically, shifting toward a retrospective tone and a focus on the 
imprisonment of alleged WikiLeaks source Bradley Manning. 
Throughout this time, journalists engaged in paradigm repair and boundary work 
in the four general areas defined earlier—institutionality, reporter-source relationships, 
original reporting, and objectivity. This chapter will examine each of those themes in 
turn, using them to illuminate the contours of the journalistic paradigm, including those 
organizations that defended WikiLeaks or were ambivalent. The results aid our 
understanding of the complex set of meanings embodied and invoked for each concept 
within the journalistic paradigm. 
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INSTITUTIONALITY 
As a whole, the professional news media responded to WikiLeaks’ nontraditional, 
diffused organizational structure by repeatedly characterizing WikiLeaks as an unstable 
group that essentially consisted solely of an erratic, egomaniacal figure who should not 
be taken seriously. This picture of WikiLeaks did not begin in earnest until after the 
group edged closer to traditional news organizations and emerged as a global journalistic 
player by working with them on and then releasing the Afghanistan leak in July; in fact, 
up until that point, most news organizations portrayed the group’s amorphous structure as 
an asset for playing a watchdog role and eluding censorship. In one typical description, 
the Washington Post depicted its networked nature as a critical tool for both its 
accessibility and its power to resist oppressive actors: “Lacking a home base or 
traditional infrastructure, it is almost entirely virtual, relying on servers and helpers in 
dozens of countries. It is accessible anywhere the Internet goes, yet it is relatively 
immune from pressure from censors, lawyers or local governments” (Warrick, 2010, 
para. 6). Similar characterizations were found in the New York Times, NPR, the 
Guardian, and the alternative news source Salon (Cohen & Stelter, 2010; Greenwald, 
2010c; Luft, 2009b; Sydell, 2008). 
WikiLeaks’ structure was also occasionally described in these sympathetic terms 
after its rise to prominence—for example, just after the Afghanistan leak, one Guardian 
columnist called the group “brilliantly constructed” (Cadwalladr, 2010, para. 38) and in 
December 2010, a CNN anchor said Assange was keeping WikiLeaks’ workings secret 
“so that WikiLeaks workers and staffers are kept safe, he says, because the work that they 
do is so important” (Holmes et al., 2010a). But by and large, this motif had disappeared 
from discourse about WikiLeaks by mid-2010, and by the following spring, the New York 
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Times’ book on WikiLeaks described the same structure in terms that connoted naiveté 
about the feasibility of such a decentralized venture (Burns & Somaiya, 2011). 
In its place was a portrayal of WikiLeaks that continually connoted instability and 
shadowiness, even manifesting skepticism about its legitimacy as an organization in the 
first place. In one Times article about Daniel Domscheit-Berg’s defection from the group, 
Assange was referred to not as a bona fide leader but as WikiLeaks’ “figurehead” 
(Somaiya, 2010a, para. 2). The article also put scare quotes around WikiLeaks’ 
“suspending” Domscheit-Berg, thus undermining the legitimacy of WikiLeaks to take 
such apparently formal action (para. 6). This was part of a pattern for the Times in 
particular, which also referred to WikiLeaks members as “loyalists” and “conspirators,” 
(Burns & Somaiya, 2010a, para. 2, 36) rather than more institutional titles such as 
colleagues, staff, volunteers, or members. Other mainstream news organizations like the 
Washington Post and Wall Street Journal occasionally showed similar reluctance to 
confer institutional legitimacy, referring to Assange’s titles or roles as “self-described” or 
“self-appointed” (Cody, 2010b, para. 3; Weidner, 2010, para. 8). Some mainstream news 
organizations also emphasized their skepticism of WikiLeaks’ organizational legitimacy 
by setting it against established institutions. A source quoted approvingly in a Times 
public editor’s column compared the group unfavorably to the Associated Press, one of 
modern journalism’s oldest, largest, and most respected institutions (Brisbane, 2010), and 
Guardian editor David Leigh set up a dichotomy between WikiLeaks and “sensible 
media organizations” (Wells, 2010). Likewise, a PBS MediaShift columnist contrasted 
the way the Times was “responsibly confronting a new journalistic reality,” with 
Assange’s vanity and pettiness (Hannah, 2011, para. 15). 
A key reason for this institutional skepticism of WikiLeaks was its geographical 
rootlessness. The professional news media were preoccupied with this characteristic, 
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frequently mentioning it as one of WikiLeaks’ and Assange’s core defining attributes. 
The adjective most often used to describe Assange was “nomadic” (e.g., Cody, 2010a; 
Johnson, 2010; Whalen, 2010c), and the anecdotal detail employed most often was his 
habit of sleeping on the couches on friends (e.g., Cadwalladr, 2010; Burns & Somaiya, 
2011; Thiessen, 2010c). Assange and WikiLeaks’ choices of unorthodox, less rooted 
communication technology were of particular interest to many in the professional news 
media: The group’s use of Twitter, Skype, and regularly changing mobile phones were 
often marveled at as evidence of the group’s bizarre nonconformity to institutional norms 
(Burns & Schmitt, 2010; Burns & Somaiya, 2010b, 2011; Rusbridger, 2011). (It was rare 
for the news organizations to note that WikiLeaks was so difficult to pin down 
geographically in large part because of the scrutiny it was facing because of its 
publishing; the Guardian was the only professional news organization to point this out 
with any frequency.) What precisely were the professional news media hoping to 
accomplish by portraying Assange and WikiLeaks in such terms? On a few occasions, the 
organizations’ editors made the implied point clear: WikiLeaks’ geographical 
rootlessness was the type of behavior engaged in not by established news organizations 
but by criminals. The Times’ Bill Keller called Assange “a source who acted like a 
fugitive” (2011a, para. 18), and the Guardian’s Leigh chided Assange for talking about 
justice while making “a virtue out of a nomadic, virtually stateless, existence that 
circumvented traditional systems of justice” (2011, para. 5). It was the same behavior his 
colleagues had described as brilliant months earlier, but now that WikiLeaks had 
emerged as more than a curiosity they saw it as a threat that could endanger their 
profession’s credibility. 
Another critical step in the process of highlighting and denigrating WikiLeaks’ 
lack of institutionality was that of reducing the organization to a single person—Julian 
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Assange. An October 2010 Times feature on Assange was most direct in this emphasis, as 
its central premise was that Assange was increasingly being abandoned by his 
collaborators because of his egomaniacal behavior. As a result, the article stated, Assange 
was performing almost every duty in the group unilaterally, leaving WikiLeaks with an 
“apparent lack of accountability to anybody but himself” (Burns & Somaiya, 2010a, para. 
37). That narrative was quickly picked up by the Washington Post, which followed with 
its own story using similarly isolating language the next day (Nakashima & Faiola, 
2010). (The Wall Street Journal also followed up on the Times’ report, but with a much 
more muted tone and a response from a WikiLeaks spokesman other than Assange 
[Whalen, 2010b].) The WikiLeaks-as-Assange narrative took such firm hold of media 
discourse that by early December, several columnists were attributing the act of 
publishing diplomatic cables to Assange himself, rather than WikiLeaks (Parker, 2010; 
Smith, 2010). 
It is important to note that the Times feature was tied to several defections of key 
WikiLeaks members—most notably Domscheit-Berg—and relied in part on Assange’s 
own words for its conflation of WikiLeaks with Assange himself, particularly a quotation 
attributed to Assange declaring that he was “the heart and soul of this organization, its 
founder, philosopher, spokesperson, original coder, organizer, financier, and all the rest” 
(Burns & Somaiya, 2010a, para. 24). Still, the reduction of WikiLeaks to solely Assange 
was not a foregone conclusion, as other news organizations, particularly the alternative 
media and the Guardian argued. The point was made most forcefully before the Times’ 
feature in a column in the Nation by philosophy professor Peter Ludlow. “The traditional 
media, governments and their security organizations just cannot get unglued from the 
idea that there must be a single mastermind behind an operation like WikiLeaks,” Ludlow 
argued. “This is not a one-man or even one-group operation. It is a network of thousands 
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motivated by a shared hacktivist culture and ethic. And with or without Assange, it is not 
going away” (2010, para. 17). Alternative and some mainstream journalists made 
attempts elsewhere to separate Assange and WikiLeaks in the public’s mind, as did 
Assange himself (Faiola, 2011; Pollitt, 2010; Walker, 2010). A Guardian editorial 
lamented that the WikiLeaks story was being reduced to a biopic of Julian Assange, 
calling it “limiting, and highly diversionary” (“WikiLeaks: The man and the idea,” 2010, 
para. 5). 
Still, the depiction of WikiLeaks as a pseudo-organizational front for Assange 
himself remained the dominant one among the professional news media in late 2010 and 
early 2011. Stripping WikiLeaks’ institutional cachet allowed professional journalism to 
more easily dismiss the group’s journalistic credibility and attack it as unstable, and 
virtually every description of Assange aided in that dismissal. In the pages of Times, he 
was variously described as “secretive, shadowy”; “a loose cannon”; “dictatorial, eccentric 
and capricious”; and “elusive, manipulative and volatile” (Burns & Schmitt, 2010, para. 
7; Burns & Somaiya, 2010a, para. 21; Ro. Cohen, 2010, para. 15; Keller, 2011a, para. 3). 
Elsewhere, “shadowy” was one of the descriptives of choice for WikiLeaks and Assange, 
and “paranoid” for Assange himself (e.g., Folkenflik, 2010; Kurtz, 2010d; Meares, 
2010a; Somaiya, 2011). There was no doubt that WikiLeaks and Assange’s 
organizational and personal eccentricities made them untrustworthy in the eyes of the 
professional news media. The view of Assange—and, by extension, WikiLeaks—that 
these descriptions were meant to encourage found their fullest expression in the writings 
of conservative alternative media sources such as the Daily Caller and Big Journalism, 
which declared their distrust for Assange with terms like “creepy” and “jerkwad 
scavenger” (Labash, 2010, para. 3; Loesch, 2010, para. 1). Conservative Washington Post 
columnist Kathleen Parker conveyed the fear of WikiLeaks as an unstable, unaccountable 
 54 
group united only by their devotion to strange technologies: “Assange is the king brat, 
but only du jour. … Alas, we are at the mercy of giddy, power-hungry nerds operating 
beyond the burden of responsibility or accountability” (2010, para. 4).  
One of the primary themes used to dismiss WikiLeaks’ journalistic value after it 
had been reduced to Assange was to emphasize what Keller called Assange’s “outlaw 
celebrity,” painting a picture of a man who was more interested in cultivating a myth 
around himself than being the leader of a serious news organization (Keller, 2011a, para. 
28). Two news organizations were particularly enamored with this image of Assange: the 
New York Times, which repeatedly described his supporters in star-struck terms and used 
phrases such as “cult figure” and “growing myth” to characterize Assange (Burns & 
Somaiya, 2010b; Keller, 2011a, para. 28; Somaiya, 2010b, para. 13); and CNN, which 
was one of the primary articulators of the metaphor of Assange as James Bond (or James 
Bond villain) and described his bail release hearing as “a celebrity trial” (Crowley et al., 
2010; Lemon et al., 2010a). CNN, with its limited discursive space and more celebrity-
driven orientation, might be expected to reduce a complex character to a celebrity or 
James Bond type, but the Times’ fixation on persona and celebrity in particular 
functioned as an attempt to discredit him as a glory hound rather than a serious journalist. 
This was most evident in Keller’s (2011a) depiction of Assange’s transformation into a 
celebrity, which implied that he had abandoned whatever principles first drove 
WikiLeaks in favor of the allure of global fame. This effort to characterize WikiLeaks as 
celebrity vehicle rather than journalistic enterprise left the professional news media 
grappling with two inconsistencies: First, they portrayed Assange as solely responsible 
for his own celebrity, when in fact celebrity is largely the product the media themselves 
(Turner, 2006). And second, they had created two images of Assange at odds with each 
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other in their work to discredit him—he was both elusive and ubiquitous, shadowy and 
self-promoting. 
Asserting the Superiority of Institutionality 
When journalists were willing to ascribe some credibility to WikiLeaks, they did 
so almost exclusively through its connections with established news organizations. 
According to several commentators in the professional news media, one of the primary 
reasons WikiLeaks partnered with those news organizations—along with their ability to 
do original reporting, which we will examine later in this chapter—was to be attributed 
some of their credibility by association (Feldstein, 2010; Kurtz, 2010c, 2011). For the 
Wall Street Journal, these associations of reputation were a concern for the news 
organizations themselves, as an editorial chastised WikiLeaks’ media partners for 
“validating Mr. Assange's methods by flying in publishing formation with him” 
(“WikiLeaks ‘bastards,’” para. 10). But the American Journalism Review’s Mark 
Feldstein considered the arrangements a beneficial one for both sides, as it allowed 
WikiLeaks to graft onto news organizations’ respectability while keeping those 
organizations at arm’s length from “lawbreaking informants” (2010, para. 10). 
Throughout this commentary ran the clear—and taken-for-granted—implication that 
WikiLeaks had no respectability in itself, but was desperately trying to gain it by 
associating itself with established, institutional organizations. 
But credibility paled in importance as an institutional attribute in journalists’ 
minds in comparison with accountability. This emerged in the WikiLeaks discourse as 
the chief value of institutions: To provide structures that put checks on individual 
behavior, ensuring that they conformed to professional norms and served the public good. 
The fear of what might happen without those structures was best articulated by former 
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New York Times attorney Floyd Abrams in a conversation with a Wall Street Journal 
editor, in which he voiced his concern about “this free-floating entity out there, unbound 
by anything … except its own advocacy of the proposition that secrets are bad” having 
access to thousands of classified documents (Jones, 2010b). These concerns were echoed 
elsewhere in the professional news media, conservative alternative media, and 
professional media criticism (Hartman, 2010; Sanchez, Baldwin, Rowlands, & Myers, 
2010; Ward, 2010). This accountability that separated journalism from non-journalism 
was particularly located in news organizations’ editorial structure, as an NPR report 
stated: “There is debate in the U.S. and elsewhere about whether Assange is indeed a 
journalist, as WikiLeaks lacks the clear editorial structure of more traditional media” 
(Kuhn, 2011). 
An instructive example of the importance of this concept of formal editorial 
accountability to journalistic institutionality came in the announcement of former 
WikiLeaks staffer Domscheit-Berg’s WikiLeaks alternative, Openleaks, which would 
work only with other news organizations and would not publish information itself. Wall 
Street Journal columnist and former publisher Gordon Crovitz (2010c) commended 
Openleaks for recognizing the importance of aligning itself with structures of 
accountability: “News organizations understand accountability, even if they don't always 
meet the highest standards, and they routinely apply judgment about how they work with 
sources and leaked material. … Unlike Mr. Assange, editors answer to someone, namely 
readers and viewers” (para. 7, 11). Of course, Assange also answers to his readers, which 
means that what Crovitz actually refers to in this argument as the difference between the 
two groups are the editorial/institutional structures that force editors in traditional news 
organizations to answer to readers. A New York Times interview with Domscheit-Berg 
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revealed a similar confusion about the perceived lack of organizational accountability in 
WikiLeaks: 
NYT: ‘What’s your official title at OpenLeaks, the new antisecrecy organization 
you’re about to start?’  
Domscheit-Berg: ‘My official title? We are trying to avoid all these things.’ 
NYT: ‘Are you at least the boss?’ 
Domscheit-Berg: ‘The boss? No, no, no, I’m not anyone’s boss. That’s funny. I’ll 
have to tell the other guys, they will have a hard laugh on this one’ (para. 15-18). 
The misunderstanding reveals the wide gulf between the way WikiLeaks’ (former) 
members saw their own editorial structure and the way professional journalists saw it: 
The Times had assumed that Openleaks’ improvement over WikiLeaks was its adoption 
of a formal editorial structure designed to ensure accountability, while Domscheit-Berg 
saw its amorphous structure as an asset, not a limitation—in fact, he created his 
organization to be more unstructured than WikiLeaks had been. 
There were some dissenting voices amid the dominant discourse about the 
unreliability of WikiLeaks and the superiority of the professional media’s institutional 
model. Several people in the liberal alternative media or within academia identified 
WikiLeaks as a threat to the professional media’s gatekeeping authority and characterized 
the media’s discourse about the group as an attempt to maintain authority—a similar 
argument to the one this paper makes (Gosztola, 2011; Greenwald, 2010b; Niles, 2010). 
There were also rare examples in the professional media and media criticism of 
journalists resisting the idea of institutionality as normative. For example, a CNN 
correspondent acknowledged that WikiLeaks could be a threat to organizations such as 
hers but praised its potentially democratizing effects nonetheless (King et al., 2010a), and 
the Wall Street Journal quoted an Economist editor calling for WikiLeaks to be judged by 
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its own standards rather than the institutional media’s (Hickins & Rutkoff, 2010). And 
the Columbia Journalism Review’s Joel Meares (2010c) criticized professional journalists 
for discrediting WikiLeaks because of its lack of institutional form: “To dismiss 
WikiLeaks and wait for more institutionalized ways of increasing transparency feels like 
a euphemism for capitulating to the status quo” (para. 10). 
But as a whole, this dimension of professional journalism’s paradigm repair and 
boundary work regarding WikiLeaks was strikingly pervasive and effective. By the end 
of 2010, the images of WikiLeaks and Assange among the American professional news 
media had been fused almost entirely, and that image was of a mythologized, iconized 
international man of mystery who worked alone, trusted no one, and could be trusted by 
no one, either. The professional news media presented its own institutions as the source 
of everything Assange and WikiLeaks lacked in this dimension: accountability, structure, 
credibility, and restraint. These were the important values represented by institutions, and 
no one without them could properly be practicing journalism. The effect of repair work 
was particularly evident in the stream of commentary offering unsolicited advice to 
WikiLeaks to take on these characteristics if it wanted to be taken seriously as part of the 
journalistic community—as one Guardian reporter called them, “pompous ‘WikiLeaks 
needs to grow up’ advice pieces” (Adams & Weaver, 2010, para. 120). In particular, two 
people from outside the Times showed the salience of this paradigm repair outside 
professional journalism itself. In one online column, a professor advised WikiLeaks to 
“professionalize and depersonalize itself as much as possible” (Deibert, 2010, para. 6) 
and as quoted in another, a former journalist warned that “they are going to have to 
evolve into an organization that has an address and identity or the clock will run out on 
that level of collaboration” (Carr, 2010, para. 27). The paradigm repair and boundary 
 59 
maintenance were complete; WikiLeaks had been placed outside the boundaries of 
professional journalism and needed to institutionalize itself to gain entry. 
REPORTER-SOURCE RELATIONSHIPS 
WikiLeaks’ challenge to the government officials with whom professional 
journalists share a culture, and their near-complete lack of relationship with those 
officials, forced journalists to pick sides between their official sources and a deviant news 
organization threatening those sources. By and large, professional journalists chose to 
side with their official sources and ostracize WikiLeaks, though they attempted to do so 
while convincing the public that they were not beholden to those officials—a strategy 
that, as we will see, was not particularly effective. 
Professional journalists identified with their official sources and defended their 
shared culture in a variety of ways in response to WikiLeaks, the most basic of which 
was their expression of concern over the potential damage this might do to the 
functioning of government. This was done most often in its most indirect form—by 
publicizing government officials’ regular condemnations of WikiLeaks largely without 
challenge. These news organizations provided a forum for government complaints about 
the threats caused by WikiLeaks’ publications predominantly in news articles (e.g., 
Barnes & Whalen, 2010; Schmitt, 2010) but also in op-ed columns by political figures 
(Feinstein, 2010) and reprinting government statements (“Statement of National Security 
Adviser,” 2010). In many cases, this discourse also extended to the government’s 
aspersions about WikiLeaks itself, not just its documents. The New York Times, for 
example, reported that WikiLeaks would not answer government phone calls and that the 
Pentagon’s attempts at “asking WikiLeaks respectfully” for its cooperation would likely 
be ignored (Schmitt, 2010, para. 11; Shanker, 2010). In the wake of the Afghanistan 
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document leak, a Washington Post news article asserted that WikiLeaks’ methods rather 
than its documents were what had drawn the ire of government officials over the years 
(Nakashima & Warrick, 2010), and after WikiLeaks intensified its redaction process 
months later, the paper quoted an anonymous government source as saying, “We don't 
trust their judgment” (Lynch & Finn, 2010, para. 14).  
While these assertions essentially provided a megaphone for government officials 
already in power, relaying such rhetoric could be justified as part of an objective 
reporting of journalists’ beats (Marshall, 2010). But the professional news media went 
further, often voicing their own concern about potential damage to government, without 
attributing it to government sources. In news coverage, the leaks were repeatedly framed 
in terms of their threat to the government, rather than the information they revealed to the 
public (e.g., N. Cohen, 2010; Faiola, 2010; Whitfield et al., 2010a), and this perspective 
was only intensified in opinion sections. In the Washington Post, staff columnists referred 
to WikiLeaks as doing “immeasurable and irreparable harm” to the U.S. government and 
complained, “So much for national security” (C. King, 2010, para. 7; Thiessen, 2010a, 
para. 3), and Wall Street Journal columnists said WikiLeaks was destroying trust in the 
U.S. government’s reliability and “waging war on its ability to conduct diplomacy and 
defend itself” (Schoenfeld, 2010, para. 10). What is particularly remarkable in this 
discourse is the degree to which these media commentators identified with the 
government itself. For example, several media members referred to the government as 
“we” and “our” (Krauthammer, 2010; Phillips et al., 2010b), and others brainstormed 
suggestions for the government to stop Assange (“Attack on WikiLeaks,” 2010; 
Thiessen, 2010d). The former political operatives often summoned as analysts on op-ed 
pages and cable news programs were, as one might expect, especially strong in their 
identification with government sources; David Gergen, a former adviser to President Bill 
 61 
Clinton, opined that Assange “isn’t fit to lick Hillary’s [Clinton] boots” (King et al., 
2010b), and former Republican strategist Tony Blankley said the only opinion that 
mattered about whether WikiLeaks documents harmed the government—including his 
own—was Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ (Roberts et al., 2010b).  
But this identification with the government sources’ concern over the potential 
effects of WikiLeaks’ publications was not the primary form of paradigm repair and 
boundary work in this area. After all, this type of rhetoric alone would also indict the New 
York Times and other mainstream news organizations that joined with WikiLeaks in 
publishing the documents. In order to separate those publications from WikiLeaks, they 
needed to demonstrate how their dealings with government fit into the prescribed roles 
and behaviors for reporter-source relationships.  
To do so, the professional news media held themselves up as a model of how to 
interact with government officials in a proper manner. The New York Times was the 
primary news organization to perform this type of repair, since they were the only 
American news organization to engage in significant interaction with the government 
over the leaks and as such, were the primary news organization in need of such repair. 
Times editors and reporters detailed their negotiations with government officials in 
several forums—particularly NPR and CNN—describing their regular discussions with 
government officials as “businesslike,” “serious,” and “fruitful” (Adams & Vascellaro, 
2010, para. 19; Keller, 2011a, para. 37). The Times was trusted enough by the U.S. 
government that it even acted as an intermediary between government officials and 
WikiLeaks, passing on requests from one party to the other while the two were not 
communicating directly with each other. While other journalists and critics occasionally 
cited the Times’ behavior as an example of how to deal responsibly with government 
officials (Farhi, 2010; Silverman, 2010), the approval that mattered far more to the Times 
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was that of the government itself. In the sample examined for this study, Times journalists 
pointed out the government’s approval of their interaction with them six times (Cox, 
2010a; Gross, 2010a, 2011; Keller, 2011a; Phillips et al., 2010a; “The War Logs 
Articles,” 2010). The Times had acted in a way that its official sources saw as 
professional and responsible, and it quite clearly saw that approval as one of the most 
important pieces of evidence before the public of its propriety in handling a controversial 
story. 
Government officials did the Times a particular favor by directly contrasting its 
behavior with what they saw as the recklessness of WikiLeaks, with the U.S. attorney 
general even saying at one point, “‘I think one can compare the way in which various 
news organizations that have been involved in this have acted, as opposed to the way in 
which WikiLeaks has’ … The news organizations, he said, acted in a ‘responsible 
manner’” (Perez & Whalen, 2010, para. 6). journalists echoed that comparison, 
repeatedly denigrating WikiLeaks for not giving government officials a chance to weigh 
in on the documents before they were published. An NPR news article cited it as a strike 
against WikiLeaks in determining whether it should be considered journalistic 
(Folkenflik, 2010), and several commentators implied or explicitly stated the same 
argument (L. King, 2010; Thiessen, 2010c). As sometime Washington Post attorney 
Jeffrey Smith put it, “it is hard to argue, based on the available facts, that Assange 
deserves the same treatment as a responsible news organization that carefully considers 
the views of the government before deciding what, if any, classified information to 
publish” (2010, para. 4).  
A key part of this repair work was the establishment of this relationship between 
journalists and sources in the public’s mind as a routine, normative practice in 
professional journalism. It may be taken for granted within journalistic circles that 
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reporters work in concert with their sources, operating in such symbiotic terms. But the 
notion of a news organization giving government officials repeated prior notice of a 
major publication of confidential documents may strike much of the public as alarming, 
so it was necessary for journalists to first persuade the public that this was, in fact, a 
journalistic norm in order to convince it that WikiLeaks was brazenly violating that norm. 
(This norm is described in detail in a 2006 American Journalism Review article [Smolkin, 
2006], and the most often cited example is that of the New York Times’ withholding 
publication of its 2005 warrantless wiretapping story for more than a year in part at the 
White House’s request.) This establishment of prior government notification as a 
professional norm was done most simply in a descriptive paragraph in a Wall Street 
Journal news article: “When established news organizations obtain classified 
information, they rarely publish it wholesale or without first consulting the government to 
authenticate the information and to ensure it doesn't compromise national security. 
WikiLeaks' model eschews that step” (Entous & Perez, 2010). More often, it was done 
through columns and commentary, using examples from past stories (Kurtz, 2010c; 
Rieder, 2010; Thiessen, 2010c). The norm was communicated most effectively when, 
once again, it was voiced as a lament from a government official himself, this time in a 
CNN interview: 
One of the great tragedies from my perspective on this from a journalistic 
perspective is if you had gotten a hold of those documents, John, you would have called 
me up and said, Geoff, we’ve got something that we think is worth publishing, but we 
need to have a conversation with you about whether it might in the process endanger the 
lives of American forces or our nation’s security. We were not afforded that conversation 
by this group. They published, and now we’re dealing with the consequences afterwards 
(King, Borger, & Dominick, 2010a).  
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Through discourse such as this, the professional news media were able to present 
a clear statement to the public, that they routinely engage in the journalistic norm of 
consulting with government officials before publishing important documents but 
WikiLeaks does not, undermining the government’s authority and their own credibility. 
Journalists from the Times (and, to a lesser extent, the Guardian) also addressed 
potential public concern about their close consultation with government sources by 
acknowledging a certain degree of conflict in that relationship. Times executive editor 
Bill Keller and one Times reporter, for example, described the paper’s meetings with 
administration officials as “tense,” with “an undertone of suppressed outrage and 
frustration” (Keller, 2011a, para. 36)—the Guardian also described one of its meetings in 
such terms (Leigh & Harding, 2011). But when Keller did write about tension in his 
paper’s relationship with government sources, he couched the conflict in statements about 
the Times’ respect for the government’s requests and about the routine nature of the 
relationship. As mentioned earlier, he referred to the Times’ meetings with government 
officials as being daily and businesslike, and said, “We listen to the government’s case 
for secrecy with great respect, but we do not always agree” (“Answers to Readers’ 
Questions,” 2010, para. 24; Keller, 2011a). Through that repair, the Times attempted to 
assert to the public that as a proper government watchdog, it does have conflict with its 
government sources, but that unlike WikiLeaks, it handles its conflict with government 
officials in an acceptable way, within appropriate, established journalistic roles. 
Professional journalists defended their symbiotic relationship with government 
officials most explicitly by emphasizing their fundamental support for the government’s 
claims to authority. Three Times opinion pieces illustrated this point most prominently. In 
one text, Keller (2011a) defended the Times’ handling of the leaked documents by 
describing the paper’s “large and personal stake in the country’s security” (unlike, 
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apparently, WikiLeaks) (para. 53). In another, conservative columnist David Brooks 
(2010) referred to the Times’ professional obligation to filter leaked information 
according to what would best preserve “world order” maintained by diplomats and 
soldiers—a value he asserted that Assange did not share. And the New Yorker’s George 
Packer was quoted approvingly by Times media columnist David Carr (2010) equating 
journalism with upholding the authority of democratic governmental institutions, saying 
of WikiLeaks, “They simply believe that the State Department is an illegitimate 
organization that needs to be exposed, which is not really journalism” (para. 11). Carr 
added that “mainstream media may spend a lot of time trying to ferret information out of 
official hands, but they largely operate in the belief that the state is legitimate and entitled 
to at least some of its secrets” (para. 21). (Interestingly enough, this was an argument that 
gained traction within at least some corners of the liberal alternative media, being made 
in both Mother Jones and Talking Points Memo [Drum, 2010; Marshall, 2010]). 
Elsewhere, commentators noted that WikiLeaks operates outside U.S. jurisdiction or, for 
that matter, a belief in its legitimacy (King et al., 2010b; Kurtz, 2010b; Sanchez et al., 
2010). Journalism, the way the professional news media defined and defended their 
paradigm in this case, must include a fundamentally supportive relationship between 
journalists and officials, something WikiLeaks does not have. 
Internal Repair Differences 
This discourse was not an example of thoroughly unified repair and boundary 
work, however; it ran into significant resistance, mostly from outside professional 
journalism but also, to a lesser extent, from within it. Virtually every component of this 
repair work was challenged: The idea that the leaks presented a danger to the U.S. 
government (or that the media should be concerned about such a danger), WikiLeaks as a 
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dysfunctional or inappropriate model for dealing with government, and the idea that 
journalists and government officials should be engaged in a symbiotic relationship. The 
effect was a severely weakened attempt at paradigm repair resulting in an ambiguous 
response to the challenge to the reporter-source relationship presented by the WikiLeaks 
case. 
At the most basic discursive level, some journalists and critics observed that the 
leaks’ damage to the functioning of government was not nearly as great as government 
officials claimed. Unlike the other areas of challenge to this repair work, this argument 
was put forward largely by two core professional news organizations themselves—the 
Times and the Guardian. Because these were the only two organizations in this survey to 
publish WikiLeaks’ documents, their argument was put forward much more as self-
defense than as a defense of WikiLeaks. The Times’ defense was less vigorous but still 
unequivocal in its dismissal of the leaks’ damage, though it always couched its dissent in 
an overall respect of the government’s role and perspective. This approach was best 
illustrated in an editorial that argued that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s claim that 
the diplomatic cable leak would be damaging to national security was an exaggeration 
because the cables simply revealed that American diplomats are savvy, professional, and 
skillful (“WikiLeaks and the Diplomats,” 2010).  
By contrast, the Guardian’s tone toward the American government officials who 
criticized WikiLeaks was filled with bitterness and derision—more of it, in fact, than any 
source examined in this study, save perhaps for Salon’s Glenn Greenwald. This tone 
began to take shape shortly after WikiLeaks’ release of the diplomatic cables and U.S. 
politicians’ subsequent calls for Assange to be arrested, prosecuted for espionage, or even 
killed. Day after day, Guardian reporters described the reaction among U.S. officials as 
“hysterical,” “rabid,” “bloodthirsty,” “chilling,” “savage,” and “tipping over towards 
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derangement,” among other epithets (Adams & Weaver, 2010, para. 22, 32; Hirsch, 2010, 
para. 3; Milne, 2010, para. 1; Townsend, Harris, Smith, Sabbagh, & Halliday, 2010, para. 
13; Weaver & Adams, 2010a, para. 89). In blog posts, the Guardian’s Washington 
reporters also mocked their American counterparts’ lack of concern about this 
government rhetoric, asking sarcastic questions like, “Why ask about the biggest story of 
the year when you can instead talk inside baseball about Republicans versus Democrats?” 
(Weaver & Adams, 2010b, para. 164). The Guardian’s caustic tone was striking 
compared with American journalists’ acquiescence, but it was also understandable—the 
Guardian had no real relationships with these official sources to protect. Several 
Guardian opinion pieces and blogs described WikiLeaks’ conflict with government as 
being largely or even wholly between the group and the United States (Preston, 2010; 
Edwards, 2010), and the paper’s editor-in-chief, Alan Rusbridger (2011), later described 
himself as a distant observer in London, astonished at the violent rhetoric toward 
WikiLeaks coming from Washington. In this way, the Guardian saw (and portrayed) 
itself much like the American alternative media did—as outsiders who watched with 
bewilderment the outrageous pronouncements of government officials and lamented the 
complicity of the American news media in them. The Guardian may have had source-
based reporting routines to defend in other cases, but it was not threatened on that front 
by WikiLeaks, as the paper portrayed itself as being without a significant relationship 
with the U.S. government to protect. The primary officials with whom it did have a 
relationship that was crucial to its reporting routines—the British government—were far 
less vocal in their public reaction (Rusbridger, 2011). For the Guardian, then, this area of 
its paradigm was safely undisturbed, unlike the Times’. 
Others—especially in the liberal alternative media—saw WikiLeaks as a threat to 
the U.S. government, but one that played a valuable role in exposing its monopoly on 
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information and shifting the balance of power back toward the public. Several pieces in 
the Nation urged support for what one author called WikiLeaks’ “public service” 
(Flanders, 2010)—its ability through the free flow of information to reveal truths that the 
establishment would prefer to keep secret (“First, They Came,” 2010; Sifry, 2011b). 
Salon columnist Dan Gillmor summarized the argument succinctly: “What WikiLeaks 
represents is what governments and corporations fear: a threat to their cultures of secrecy 
and dominance in their domains” (2010a, para. 16). Isolated utterances of these 
sentiments could be found in the professional news media, such as a statement in a 
Guardian editorial that “WikiLeaks' chief crime has been to speak truth to power” 
(“Cyber Attacks,” 2010, para. 5) and a Washington Post op-ed column by journalist 
Adam Penenberg calling WikiLeaks a “thorn in the side of secrecy-obsessed 
governments” (2011, para. 3).  
According to this view, the government’s denunciation of WikiLeaks was not 
done out of concern over national security, privacy, or even international embarrassment; 
instead, it was a desperate attempt to maintain a control over information that was rapidly 
slipping away. Several writers in the alternative media made this connection, led by 
Salon’s Glenn Greenwald, who wrote that “The public and private organizations most 
eager to maintain complete secrecy around what they do—including numerous U.S. 
military and intelligence agencies—are obviously threatened by WikiLeaks’ activities, 
which is why they seek to harass and cripple them” (2010a, para. 20). Elsewhere at 
Salon, the campaign against WikiLeaks was called a “war against freedom of speech” 
(Gillmor, 2010b, para. 3), and a post at the Nation argued that the government’s efforts to 
discredit Assange were prompted by his revelations of their duplicity (Scheer, 2010). In 
another Nation article, open government advocate Micah Sifry extended the 
government’s defense process against WikiLeaks to the media as well, concluding that 
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“At some fundamental level, they probably understand that the conditions for maintaining 
their monopoly on critical information have been broken” (2011b, para. 15). In essence, 
what these alternative-media commentators were describing was a paradigm repair 
process by the government that paralleled (and at times overlapped with) the one in the 
media being described in this study. Just as WikiLeaks’ radically open networked 
journalism presented a challenge to the traditional professional media’s longstanding 
control over the dissemination of information, so it also challenged government in the 
same way, and as these commentators recognized, the two groups responded in tandem. 
Many in the alternative media also resisted the professional media’s assertion that 
the normative, proper relationship between journalists and their official sources is one of 
general supportiveness and mutual trust. The argument for a skeptical, more adversarial 
relationship as the normative one between journalists and the government received a bit 
more support from professional journalists and media critics than the objection over the 
value of WikiLeaks’ challenge to government. On CNN, anchor Rick Sanchez responded 
to a guest’s assertion that Sanchez had an obligation to the security of the country’s 
military efforts by saying that his highest obligation was instead to give the public the 
truth about its government (Sanchez et al., 2010). And Time editor Richard Stengel said 
on CNN that while the leaks had likely damaged the U.S. government, journalists’ job 
was not to protect their country (Kurtz, 2010c). Likewise, at PBS’ MediaShift site, 
journalism professor Stephen Ward (2010) wrote that “The role of a free press is not to 
serve the government or its diplomats. It is to serve the public who hold government 
accountable through information provided by the media” (para. 13). It was this role that 
WikiLeaks was playing, argued one writer for the Nation, who made an important 
distinction: If with the release of the diplomatic cables Assange was attacking the people 
of each of these countries as the U.S. government claimed, his behavior would indeed be 
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terroristic. But if he was instead attacking government secrecy, he would simply be an 
honest journalist (Bromwich, 2011). 
Two writers outside of the professional media argued most forcefully that the 
patriotic, government-supporting ethic of the American press was at odds with its 
supposedly cherished watchdog function. Salon’s Greenwald (2011) stated that reporting 
with the goal of protecting government’s policy interests was not journalism but 
propaganda, and MediaShift’s Ward (2010) argued that the WikiLeaks episode had 
shown that reporters’ commitment to a free press was often undermined by their patriotic, 
nationalistic impulses: “In times of conflict, the strong emotions of patriotism override 
journalists’ in-principle commitment to critical informing the public and to impartiality. 
The word ‘patriotism’ rarely occurs in journalism codes of ethics but its influence on 
practice is substantial” (para. 11). 
In this case, journalists’ allegiance and deference to the government in general 
and their sources in particular led them to defend government officials by ostracizing 
WikiLeaks because of the threat it posed to them. Numerous people in the alternative 
media recognized this repair process; Greenwald in particular wrote about it at length in 
several posts (2010e, 2010f, 2010g, 2010h), suggesting that mainstream journalists were 
marginalizing WikiLeaks as part of their perceived role to serve government interests and 
protect their friends who were government sources. In doing so, he wrote a rather apt 
description of reporter-source relationship paradigm repair:  
Most political journalists rely on their relationships with government officials and 
come to like them and both identify and empathize with them. By contrast, 
WikiLeaks is truly adversarial to those powerful factions in exactly the way that 
these media figures are not: hence, the widespread media hatred and contempt for 
what WikiLeaks does. Just look at how important it was for Bill Keller to 
emphasize that the Government is criticizing WikiLeaks but not The New York 
Times; having the Government pleased with his behavior is his metric for 
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assessing how good his “journalism” is. If the Government is patting him on the 
head, then it’s proof that he acted ‘responsibly.’ That servile-to-power mentality 
is what gets exposed by the contrast Wikileaks provides (2010g, para. 11). 
In a podcast at the Nation, journalism scholar Jay Rosen (2011) made a more nuanced 
description of the same process, noting that journalists do consider themselves adversarial 
watchdogs of the government, but in comparison with WikiLeaks their true entwinement 
with official systems of power—an unacknowledged aspect of their paradigm—is 
revealed. By dismissing WikiLeaks’ approach to government as unreasonable, deviant, 
and irresponsible, journalists can resolve the dissonance that WikiLeaks exposes. 
The fact that this paradigm repair process was perceived so clearly by so many of 
those observing the professional news media is evidence that it was not a particularly 
effective one, and that the paradigm itself was not consensually accepted, either. 
Balancing a self-conception as an adversarial, watchdog press with the mutual trust and 
shared culture found in the relationships with those whom one sees itself as watching is 
an extremely difficult task. In this case, the professional news media struggled to hold on 
to both of those ideas simultaneously—and, particularly, to convince the public that both 
of them were true. At the same time, however, they did find some success in producing a 
salient image of WikiLeaks as childishly taunting governments rather than seriously 
engaging with them. WikiLeaks actually asked the U.S. government for help redacting 
documents at least twice—it said it lacked the resources to do so properly—and was 
rejected both times (Greenwald, 2010e; Leigh & Harding, 2011), but that fact was rarely 
pointed out even by those in the alternative media. Instead, WikiLeaks was widely seen 
as having recklessly “dumped” the documents—an image the next area of paradigm 
repair did much to establish. 
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ORIGINAL REPORTING 
While original reporting has not been particularly well developed as a concept in 
the study of the journalistic paradigm, it emerged as perhaps the most vigorous area of 
repair in the WikiLeaks case. More space was devoted in the professional media to 
demonstrating WikiLeaks’ deficiency and their own authority in terms of original 
reporting than any other, yet their statements were met with more skepticism than any 
area with the exception of reporter-source relationships. Professional journalists sought to 
portray WikiLeaks as non-journalists who simply dumped documents on the public 
without contexts, while describing their own work in contrast as providing context, 
filtering, public service, expertise, and on-the-scene reporting. Those outside professional 
journalism strongly contested that portrayal of WikiLeaks and contended that there was 
little difference between the work WikiLeaks and professional journalists were doing. We 
will first examine the two primary areas of discursive conflict regarding WikiLeaks and 
reporting—whether WikiLeaks did journalism and whether it released documents without 
context or discrimination—and then move to professional journalists’ self-conception of 
the work they do. 
One of the issues near the very center of this paradigm repair effort as a whole 
was whether WikiLeaks could be considered a journalistic organization. One of the 
primary purposes of each of professional journalism’s areas of repair and boundary work 
was to define WikiLeaks as being outside the bounds of journalism so as to keep its own 
profession from being diluted by an actor that challenged many of its core values. But the 
discussion over whether WikiLeaks could be defined as journalistic was tied most closely 
to the repair efforts regarding original reporting, as they ended up being connected to 
work of reporting in some form. That is, in order to explicitly define what journalism 
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was, journalists most often went to terms that described work, rather than ideological 
values like objectivity or structural attributes like institutionality.  
But this sort of journalistic definition and exclusion regarding WikiLeaks did not 
begin in earnest until mid-2010, when WikiLeaks broke into public prominence and 
emerged as a serious challenge to traditional journalistic forms. Up until then, news 
organizations generally treated WikiLeaks as one of their own, if a bit unorthodox in its 
constitution. Several articles during this time referred to WikiLeaks’ members as 
journalists and their work as reporting or newsgathering (Bumiller, 2010; Jones, 2010a; 
“Stifling Online Speech,” 2008). That changed after WikiLeaks began making its major 
releases, when the two news organizations that worked most closely with WikiLeaks 
stated emphatically that the group was not a journalistic one—the Guardian did so 
immediately after the Afghanistan release in July 2010, though the Times did not 
officially and explicitly say so until the fall (“Answers to Readers’ Questions,” 2010; 
Wells, 2010)—and writers from other news organizations followed with similar 
statements (Crovitz, 2010c; Robinson, 2010b; Thiessen, 2010b). Others just as 
emphatically declared that WikiLeaks and Assange were, in fact, journalists. The 
language of “WikiLeaks as journalist” came from the alternative media (Scheer, 2010) 
and professional media criticism (Chittum, 2010; C. O’Brien, 2010b), but also from 
sources in the professional news media—largely guest commentators and contributors not 
formally affiliated with the organizations themselves (L. King, 2010; Lemon et al., 
2010b). At the Washington Post, Adam Penenberg (2011) contrasted his opinion to the 
repair being attempted by the professional news media, which included ”no clear 
definition of the terms ‘journalist’ or ‘journalism’” (para. 4), but after examining various 
shield law definitions, he concluded that “Assange fits the definition of a journalist, and 
what WikiLeaks does qualifies as journalism” (para. 5). 
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So what exactly were professional journalists’ working definitions of journalism 
as they discussed it vis-à-vis WikiLeaks? And what were the criteria by which WikiLeaks 
was portrayed as unjournalistic? The answer to the latter question—and some clues to the 
first—can be found in the second major area of tension regarding WikiLeaks—whether it 
dumped its documents on the public without any context or filtering. Of all the areas of 
repair undertaken by the professional news media in relation to WikiLeaks (indeed, of all 
their areas of description in general), none occupied more of journalists’ attention than 
this one. Dozens of articles and broadcast segments described WikiLeaks as 
indiscriminately flooding the public with thousands of sensitive, difficult-to-understand 
documents rather than performing the journalistic functions of editing and adding 
context; in many of those texts, this description was the central reason given for the 
difference between WikiLeaks and professional journalism. 
This characterization sometimes became part of the shorthand for describing 
WikiLeaks’ work, with it often being referred to in passing as having “dumped mountains 
of secrets” or a released a “flood” of documents (Erlanger, 2010, para. 1; Levingston, 
2010, para. 1). More often, it was part of a concerted argument for WikiLeaks’ 
unreliability or irresponsibility, often in opinion sections or in quotations from 
commentators in news articles or during broadcast segments. Several writers and 
commentators complained that the indiscriminate nature of their release left them so 
incomprehensible and devoid of context to be useless (Applebaum, 2010a, 2010b; Exum, 
2010; Pegoraro, 2010; Rieder, 2010). In one typical text, Washington Post columnist 
Anne Applebaum (2010a) dismissed the Afghanistan documents as “nothing more than 
raw data,” concluding that “without more investigation, more work, more journalism, 
these documents just don't matter that much” (para. 6, 11). Others saw WikiLeaks’ 
primary problem in document dumping as its dereliction of its obligation to the continued 
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functional operation of government and safety of the people affected, particularly U.S. 
informants (Ri. Cohen, 2010; Crovitz, 2010b; Jones, 2010b; “The Justice Department,” 
2010). Post columnist Dana Milbank (2010) encapsulated this contempt for WikiLeaks’ 
apparent lack of restraint or concern for others’ safety: “Assange’s indiscriminate dump 
of American government secrets over the last several months—with hardly a care for 
who might be hurt or what public good was served—can be summarized nicely by a line 
from Wilde’s play ‘A Woman of No Importance’: Nothing succeeds like excess” (para. 
4). This was the reason, in fact, that the Times refused to link to WikiLeaks’ publication 
of the Afghanistan war documents (Thiessen, 2010b). For many within the professional 
news media, this “dumping” was the central (or only) justification for describing 
WikiLeaks as being outside the bounds of journalism (Crovitz, 2010c; L. King, 2010; 
Kurtz, 2010d).  
The key terms that served to signify the dichotomy between WikiLeaks’ and 
professional journalists’ forms of releasing information were “responsible” and 
“irresponsible.” In the sample studied, forms of the two words were used at least 35 times 
to refer to either WikiLeaks or professional news organizations; in 30 of the cases 
examined, the word “responsible” was used to describe professional news organizations, 
or “irresponsible” (or “not responsible”) was used to describe WikiLeaks. Just five times 
was WikiLeaks or its practices described as responsible. While the terms were 
occasionally used to describe other paradigmatic elements such as consulting with 
official sources, they were overwhelmingly employed as a proxy for the difference in 
approaches to releasing information: filtering and editing information before publication 
was responsible, while releasing large amounts of information without extensively going 
through those steps was irresponsible. A statement from a Guardian op-ed column 
illustrates the conception of “responsible” behavior and its dichotomy with WikiLeaks 
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well: “The Guardian, like the New York Times and other responsible news media, has 
tried to ensure that nothing we publish puts anyone at risk. We should all demand of 
WikiLeaks that it does the same” (Ash, 2010, para. 11). CNN host Piers Morgan also tied 
the responsible/irresponsible dichotomy to the idea of indiscriminate publication by 
saying the Times and Guardian “are being, in my view, quite responsible whereas I think 
WikiLeaks putting everything out there ought to be more judicious in their editing” 
(Crowley et al., 2010). In the minds of professional journalists, the difference between 
responsible and irresponsible journalistic behavior lay in the editorial process that limited 
the amount of information disseminated to the public—a process in which they 
emphatically claimed WikiLeaks did not engage. 
Criticism of WikiLeaks’ relative lack of filtering and redaction in several of its 
publications was not limited to a paradigmatic sense, however. Several of WikiLeaks’ 
staunchest supporters, including Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg (Nichols, 2010) 
and even Salon’s Glenn Greenwald (2010g), acknowledged their concerns about the lack 
of redaction in WikiLeaks’ releases, particularly its first large-scale document release on 
the war in Afghanistan. While these writers had understandable misgivings about 
WikiLeaks’ lackluster editorial standards, they did not see it as a reason to characterize 
the group as irresponsible or unjournalistic, unlike WikiLeaks’ critics within professional 
journalism. 
But as potent as it seemed, professional journalism’s narrative of WikiLeaks as 
irresponsible document dumpers did not entirely match the reality of situation. By its 
second large-scale document release, the Iraq War logs, WikiLeaks was employing a 
system of “reverse” redaction that was actually more rigorous in identifying and 
eliminating potentially sensitive names than the U.S. government’s own redaction 
process (Weinstein, 2010). And by its third release, the diplomatic cables, WikiLeaks was 
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publishing only the cables published by its media partners, initially releasing just a few 
hundred of the 251,000 cables and gradually leaking out a few thousand more over the 
next few months before the entire cache was inadvertently made public in the summer of 
2011 (Gunter, 2011; Shepard, 2010). Even in the Afghanistan war logs found most 
problematic by its supporters and critics, WikiLeaks held back 15,000 documents to take 
additional time redacting them (Whalen, 2010a). 
Professional journalists noted these facts somewhat regularly as part of their basic 
reporting on WikiLeaks’ activities, though without any particular emphasis. (NPR was 
goaded into correcting its reporting regarding the number of cables released by a 
significant public backlash [Shepard, 2010].) CNN and the Guardian were particularly 
diligent in their accuracy about WikiLeaks’ actual practices, and the Guardian’s editor, 
Alan Rusbridger, actively sought to debunk the popular notion that WikiLeaks had 
indiscriminately dumped documents, writing, “The extent of the redaction process and 
the relatively limited extent of publication of actual cables were apparently overlooked by 
many commentators—including leading American journalists—who spoke disparagingly 
of a ‘willy nilly dump’ of mass cables and the consequent danger to life. But, to date, 
there has been no ‘mass dump’” (2011, para. 18). 
Defining the Process of Original Reporting 
As a whole, though, those in the liberal alternative media and in professional 
media criticism were far more vocal than the professional media in their resistance to the 
idea of WikiLeaks’ having indiscriminately dumped documents. (It went unaddressed in 
the conservative alternative media examined in this study.) Among professional media 
critics, the Columbia Journalism Review was especially vigilant in countering that 
misconception, with three different writers mounting attacks against it (Chittum, 2010; 
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Hendler, 2010a; Silverman, 2011). In this area, too, Salon’s Glenn Greenwald emerged as 
the chief defender of WikiLeaks’ editorial diligence, addressing it in several posts 
(2010h, 2010i). He was flanked by several other writers in the liberal alternative media, 
who repeatedly noted the limited release and care in redaction following the publication 
of the diplomatic cables (“First, They Came,” 2010; Gillmor, 2010c). 
Despite these protestations, the depiction of WikiLeaks as an irresponsible and 
reckless publisher remained a dominant form of paradigm repair and boundary work 
within the professional media, and a primary rationale for denying them a place within 
the boundaries of journalism. In that repair work, journalists painted a vivid picture of 
their own reporting and editing work in contrast to WikiLeaks, providing a remarkably 
rich landscape of precisely what journalistic work they believe distinguishes their field 
from other similar actors. It is this work that makes up the journalistic conception that 
this study refers to as “original reporting,” and it will be addressed in four particular areas 
in descending order of their expressed importance among journalists in this case: adding 
context, filtering and verification, considering the public interest, and expertise and 
experience. 
In professional journalists’ minds, the process of adding context—of explaining to 
the public what the documents were and what their significance was—was the single 
most significant value they provided to WikiLeaks’ document releases. Journalists from 
the Times and the Guardian repeatedly touted their own ability to provide this 
contextualized understanding of the documents. According to them, that context kept the 
documents from becoming overwhelming to the public (“WikiLeaks: Open Secrets,” 
2010) and brought them attention they wouldn’t have otherwise received (Keenan, 2010). 
Keller (2011a), the Times’ editor, pointed to his reporters’ ability to draw order from 
chaos as the attribute of their WikiLeaks coverage that made him most proud, and 
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journalists from both papers made similar statements about what their papers brought to 
the WikiLeaks publication process (e.g., “Answers to Readers’ Questions,” 2010; “Ask 
the Reporters,” 2010; Brooks, 2010; Carr, 2010; Greenslade, 2010b). Their argument for 
self-justification before the public, and their case for their own journalistic value, was 
most simply put by Guardian editor David Leigh in a short video introducing the 
Afghanistan war logs: “We’ve trawled through all this data so that you can make sense of 
it” (“How to Read,” 2010). A Times editor’s note on the diplomatic cables also suggested 
that this context-adding process went beyond simply adding journalistic value into the 
realm of moral obligation: “For The Times to ignore this material would be to deny its 
own readers the careful reporting and thoughtful analysis they expect when this kind of 
information becomes public” (“A Note to Readers,” para. 9). The implied message put an 
extraordinary value on the process of explaining the news, rather than simply presenting 
its raw materials as objects of evidence to the public; though the public would be getting 
the information regardless of the Times’ actions, the paper was journalistically obligated 
to give it meaning, rather than letting it stand on its own. 
It followed, then, that if the process of explaining the significance of news objects 
to the public was a journalistic obligation, then to not engage in this process was to be a 
journalist. This premise was expressed most directly in an interview with Times reporter 
David Sanger on NPR’s “Fresh Air” in which, after making a similar point to the Times 
editor’s note, Sanger was asked whether he considered Assange a journalist. He replied: 
I don’t, and the reason is that I believe what journalists do is not only dig out 
information but filter it, explain it, put it in context, do those things that you've 
come to expect of the New York Times and other great American newspapers and 
other media organizations for many decades. That’s a very different thing from 
simply downloading a computer system and throwing it out onto the World Wide 
Web (Gross, 2010b). 
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Sanger later added that for the Times, contextualizing information meant that “We are 
explaining what’s new here and what’s not. We’re explaining what’s important here and 
what’s not” (Gross, 2010b). The difference between the Times’ “commendable” 
journalistic behavior and WikiLeaks’ technical act of publishing was simply giving 
explanation and context, which imbued the information with meaning and turned 
publication into journalism. Guardian editor-in-chief Alan Rusbridger made a similar 
point in a reader Q&A session when he compared his paper’s contributions with 
WikiLeaks’, saying that “we brought something to the party in our ability to search, 
contextualise, verify, explain etc. They have some very smart people, too, and some very 
unique technical skills” (Rusbridger, 2010). To Rusbridger, WikiLeaks’ actions were of a 
technical sort, but what distinguished his own paper as a news organization was its ability 
to contextualize and explain. 
Within this framework, WikiLeaks’ partnership with news organizations was a 
tacit acknowledgement by Assange that the value that they provided but WikiLeaks 
couldn’t was in their ability to add context. Numerous articles both from the Times and 
Guardian themselves (“20 Things We Learned,” 2010; Naughton, 2011) and from the 
larger professional journalistic community (Applebaum, 2010a; Kurtz, 2010a; “What 
WikiLeaks Means,” 2011) made precisely this point. In their argument, this collaboration 
meant that an emergent form of networked media had acknowledged the enduring value 
and relevance of traditional media. 
The second paradigmatic aspect of reporting—filtering and editing—is a much 
simpler process than that of adding context. As professional journalists described it, it 
involves the application of “news judgment” as a filter on incoming information, thereby 
verifying its authenticity and limiting the information provided to the public. By doing 
this, journalists said, they helped impose order on a massive amount of information and 
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curbed its potential danger to informants and other vulnerable parties. Journalists from 
the Times and Guardian often pointed out the role that this process played in their 
handling of the documents (“Answers to Readers’ Questions,” 2010; Brooks, 2010; Cox, 
2010a; Tait, Fernando, Poulton, Gallagher, & Topham, 2010), though they did not ascribe 
to it nearly as much value as they did to the process of adding context. One Times 
reporter did, however, hint at the importance of the routinized nature of this process when 
he explained to CNN that the filtering process was what enabled the paper to feel 
comfortable publishing sensitive documents: “We always felt we could publish the 
documents if they went through the careful process we normally do” (Phillips et al., 
2010a). 
What exactly that process entailed in this case was not entirely clear, though 
Times and Guardian journalists emphasized several aspects: it was methodical and 
selective (“Answers to Readers’ Questions,” 2010; Tait et al., 2010), it involved 
consultation with experts (Cox, 2010a; Elliott, 2010), and it also involved assessments of 
both security and newsworthiness (“Answers to Readers’ Questions,”2010; Gross, 
2010a). Several professional news media members outside those organizations referred to 
the process approvingly, citing it as a reason for ascribing credibility to the Times and the 
Guardian and urging other news organizations to approach the documents the same way 
(Crovitz, 2010c; Crowley et al., 2010; Jones, 2010b). But this process was highlighted, 
more than anything, in professional journalists’ description of WikiLeaks didn’t do in 
publishing large portions of documents, rather than anything journalists did in particular. 
Much of that description was described previously as part of the debate over whether 
WikiLeaks’ indiscriminately dumped documents, but only a few professional media 
commentators contrasted the two explicitly in this area. When they did, the message was 
simple: WikiLeaks (and the public) would have been better served by adopting a 
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strenuous filtering method like the Times and the Guardian, rather than simply releasing 
the documents in one big dump (Crovitz, 2010c, 2011; Crowley et al., 2010; Lemon et 
al., 2010b). 
The third aspect of original reporting that emerged in this paradigm repair process 
was the application of expertise and experience. These terms were used often to disparage 
WikiLeaks and tout the advantages of the professional news media, as numerous 
commentators belittled Assange for what they saw as his lack of understanding of the 
issues on which he was releasing documents (e.g., Ro. Cohen, 2010; Foust, 2010; Kemp, 
2010; Kirchick, 2010). Without detailed experience—particularly “on the ground” 
experience—in the areas of the world about which he was publishing information, they 
argued, Assange had no expertise from which to draw on in the processes of filtering and 
contextualizing his documents. In contrast, the Times, Guardian, and others in 
professional journalism held up their own experience as a critical factor in their ability to 
perform those same journalistic processes (Applebaum, 2010; Leigh & Harding, 2011; 
Tait et al., 2010). 
How was one to go about gaining all of this valuable journalistic experience and 
expertise? The only means described (and prescribed) was through “on-the-ground 
reporting,” particularly overseas (Kurtz, 2010b; Leigh & Harding, 2011). Interestingly, 
even Assange himself cited the authority and expertise derived their physical presence 
and experience in global hotspots as one of the primary reasons he chose to collaborate 
with the Times and the Guardian (L. King et al., 2010). Others went further, asserting 
that the WikiLeaks documents meant little without being accompanied and 
contextualized by the on-the-scene reporting work done by professional journalists. The 
Washington Post’s Applebaum (2010a) said the documents suffered from a lack of 
“proper newspaper reporting,” concluding that “there weren't any reporters, or any time 
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to do real journalism” with journalists “on the ground,” so the documents were unable to 
be properly contextualized (para. 7-8). The Columbia Journalism Review’s Joel Meares 
(2010b) made a similar point, though less aggressively, characterizing the WikiLeaks 
documents as snapshots “that demand fleshing out by those who are well-versed in the 
war from which they sprang. Rather than suggest a worrying future for investigative, on-
the-ground reporting, WikiLeaks shows that it’s as important as ever” (para. 6-7). These 
pronouncements indicated a belief that whatever journalistic value the WikiLeaks 
documents held, it could only be realized when “on the ground” reporting methods, and 
the experience and expertise they provided, were applied by professional journalists. 
One of the key values applied during these journalistic reporting, filtering, and 
context-adding processes is considering the public interest, the final paradigmatic aspect 
of reporting. Compared with the previous two aspects, the Times’ and Guardian’s own 
journalists did relatively little explanation of this point; it was mostly limited to mentions 
about determining whether pieces of WikiLeaks’ information were in the public’s interest 
to publish (“A note to readers,” 2010; Greenslade, 2010b; Tait et al., 2010). By contrast, 
other professional news media members described journalists’ consideration of the public 
interest as a critical part of the reporting and editing process—and one which entails its 
own distinctive process itself. Wall Street Journal columnist Gordon Crovitz (2010a) 
sarcastically described the traditional process by which a news organization determined 
whether to publish leaked information as a philosophically oriented one invoking 
important values: “This often came after journalistic soul-searching on the balance 
between national security and the public's right to know. How quaint” (para. 1-2). 
Similarly, in an NPR interview, a Daily Beast reporter described the process as serious, 
philosophical, and heavily value-laden: “Our news organizations go through long, 
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tortured conversations about what to do with that information, whether or not it would 
indeed endanger national security if we were to make it public” (Amos, 2010). 
Just as with all of the other areas of repair, this sense of careful consideration of 
the public interest was characterized as, in this case, strictly the province of professional 
journalism—something WikiLeaks did not possess. Times columnist David Brooks 
(2010) insisted that publication decisions were easy for Assange because he did not share 
the same professional obligation to the public good as journalists did, and several others 
criticized WikiLeaks for not considered whether its information releases would benefit 
the public (Crovitz, 2010a; Milbank, 2010); an NPR news piece cited secrecy expert 
Stephen Aftergood in describing issues of public interest and the public good as 
“fundamental journalistic questions” that WikiLeaks was not asking (Folkenflik, 2010). 
And as the Guardian’s David Leigh put it, this journalistic concern for the public interest 
was one of the main reasons it asked WikiLeaks to share the cables with his paper: “It 
was our idea to persuade WikiLeaks that they shouldn’t just dump this stuff, that they 
should let sensible media organizations have a look at it and analyze it for what was in 
the public interest as far as we were concerned” (Wells, 2010). As described by 
journalists, consideration of the public interest was a driving value that distinguished the 
journalistic process from the process of mere publication—and a value that required a 
rather esoteric process of its own to apply. 
Together, these four aspects formed a picture of professional journalists’ 
paradigmatic conception of original reporting. It was a process of first filtering and 
editing and ultimately contextualizing raw objects of information (in this case, 
documents), with the expertise gleaned exclusively from on-the-ground reporting and the 
consideration of the public interest as a journalistic value playing crucial roles along the 
way. Without engaging in this process, WikiLeaks couldn’t be considered journalistic, 
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and its documents held negligible value; the process itself was the means by which 
publication became journalism and information became news. No statement captured the 
faith in this process and the synthesis of its component parts as well as that of American 
Journalism Review columnist Rem Rieder (2010): “Those nuggets [in WikiLeaks’ 
documents] in and of themselves, however, often don’t tell you much. They scream for 
context and perspective and interpretation, for insightful parsing by expert reporters. For 
journalism” (para. 8-9). 
During the time that professional journalists were performing this repair and 
boundary work, WikiLeaks itself moved toward journalism, in its rhetoric and its 
behavior. The group began making frequent references to journalism in its description of 
itself on its site (Penenberg, 2011; Savage, 2010b) and in its statements about itself to 
professional media sources (Assange, 2010b; Roberts et al., 2010a). It made conscious 
efforts to closely align itself with prominent news organizations—which, as we saw in 
the section on institutionality, was not necessarily reciprocated by those organizations—
and to engage in the type of behavior that many professional journalists considered part 
of the process of original reporting, such as more intensive editing and sending reporters 
to the site of a video it released (Domscheit-Berg, 2011; Weinstein, 2010). WikiLeaks 
seemed to recognize the boundaries that had been set up around professional journalism 
and seemed to conclude that in order to gain acceptance and attention among professional 
journalists, it needed to move inside those boundaries. 
Professional journalists acknowledged this “move-toward-journalism” and 
responded in two distinct ways. First, they characterized it as a strategic, even cynical, 
attempt to be seen as journalistic by the public. In this description, WikiLeaks was 
attempting to “strike a posture of responsibility” (Carr, 2010, para. 9) rather than actually 
being responsible; it was “prefer[ring] to be perceived as more of a legitimate journalistic 
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entity” (R. Walker, 2011, para. 7) rather than actually becoming a legitimate journalistic 
entity. Second, many journalists saw the changes as a genuine shift in WikiLeaks’ 
approach that was part of its evolutionary trajectory as an organization, but they viewed 
that shift as an acknowledgement of the superiority of professional journalism over 
WikiLeaks’ core networked approach. This condescension toward WikiLeaks’ 
nontraditional form of journalism is evident in statements like the one that Assange “has 
gradually become more like a real journalist” (Kurtz, 2010d) (implying, of course, that he 
had been a fake one with his previous methods). Another professional journalist 
described WikiLeaks’ previous approach as “incredibly arrogant” and said that 
“WikiLeaks is beginning to change its MO to enter into exactly that journalistic code of 
ethics, which I think is the right way to do it” (Cox, 2010b). Through either method, the 
superiority of the journalistic paradigm was maintained: WikiLeaks and Assange were 
either recognizing the superiority of the paradigm of original reporting, or they remained 
outside of professional journalism for only pretending to adopt its reporting, filtering, and 
contextualizing processes. 
OBJECTIVITY 
Objectivity also emerged as an area of paradigm repair and boundary work 
regarding WikiLeaks, though it was not as vigorously contested in the professional news 
media as the other three areas. Though there was considerable debate, the overriding 
depiction of WikiLeaks among professional journalists was of an organization whose 
explicit political goals made it difficult for it to perform true journalism and undermined 
the credibility of its information. Objectivity was also the primary area of repair within 
the conservative alternative media (and more conservative members of the professional 
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media), though it was often described as a function of WikiLeaks’ association with the 
professional news media itself, rather than a reason for dissociation from it. 
WikiLeaks was routinely described within the professional news media in terms 
that did not connote objectivity, but instead indicated varying degrees of extreme political 
principles. At the most benign level, WikiLeaks and Assange were described as 
“activists” (Bumiller, 2010; C. O’Brien, 2010a; Schmitt & Sanger, 2010)—a term that 
Assange himself often used to describe his group (Cohen & Stelter, 2010; Holmes et al., 
2010b). Further along the spectrum of political extremity, WikiLeaks was also referred to 
several times as “anarchists” (Crovitz, 2011; Kurtz, 2010c; Montagne, 2011); this was a 
description Assange denied (Mitchell, 2010), but one that could be a reasonable 
interpretation of his own writings around the time of WikiLeaks’ founding (Assange, 
2006a, 2006b; Bady, 2010). While many of these descriptions were not explicitly tied to 
journalism, they were stated in such a way to communicate distaste for WikiLeaks’ views 
and skepticism about its credibility. Keller (2011a) described Assange as “a man who 
clearly had his own agenda” (para. 5), and a Washington Post editorial similarly asserted 
that by calling for war crimes prosecutions based on his Afghanistan documents, 
“revealed his organization's antiwar agenda” (“Wikileaks’ Release,” 2010, para. 1), as 
though Assange had inadvertently let slip a particularly damaging revelation. Elsewhere 
in the professional news media, Assange was referred to as a “zealot” (Kurtz, 2010c) with 
“toxic political views” (Schoenfeld, 2011, para. 11). By contrast, the Guardian’s 
journalists and a few others (C. O’Brien, 2010a; Raz, 2010) were often careful to place 
WikiLeaks’ views in the context of its roots in the hacker philosophy, explaining it 
simply as an advocacy for open information and a severe distrust of power and secrecy 
(Arthur, 2010; Leigh & Harding, 2011). 
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While such descriptions did not necessarily constitute active repair, another 
depiction of WikiLeaks—at the least, as anti-American, and at its most vociferous, as an 
enemy of the United States—was more pervasive and formed the backbone of the repair 
and boundary work surrounding objectivity. These characterizations originated in part 
from journalists’ patriotic impulse discussed earlier (Ward, 2010) and conveyed 
WikiLeaks more in terms of a political or even military actor than a journalistic one, 
someone who was more interested in attacking and making enemies of the government 
than objectively reporting on it. WikiLeaks’ information releases were quite often 
referred to not as journalistic acts, but as military ones—as “attacks,” “sabotage,” or even 
“waging war” or “cyberwarfare” against the United States (Cox, 2010b; J. King et al., 
2010c; Schoenfeld, 2010, para. 10; Stephens, 2010, para. 11). The implications of 
invoking such language for journalism were clear, but two conservative columnists made 
them explicit. The Wall Street Journal’s Gabriel Schoenfeld (2011) asserted that 
WikiLeaks had “a decidedly non-neutral objective: combating the U.S.” (para. 10) that 
fundamentally conflicted with the imperative to perform neutral, objective journalism. 
The Washington Post’s Marc Thiessen (2010a) went further, declaring that “WikiLeaks is 
not a news organization; it is a criminal enterprise” whose sole reason for existence was 
to distribute the United States government’s classified information (para. 1). Even if other 
journalists would not make such a sweeping statement about WikiLeaks’ intent, they 
were resounding in their assertion that WikiLeaks was devoted to harming the United 
States at the expense of its aspirations to journalism. 
Thiessen’s column was one of many statements in the professional news media 
that explicitly declared that Assange and WikiLeaks were not journalists precisely 
because they did not practice an objective approach. This distinction was made primarily 
through creating a dichotomy between “activists” and “journalists”; most descriptions of 
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WikiLeaks assumed that he could only be one of the two (though there were some 
exceptions [Bumiller, 2010; C. O’Brien, 2010a; Rich, 2010]). In its profile of WikiLeaks 
following the release of the Collateral Murder video, for example, a Times reporter noted 
that Assange described himself as both a journalist and advocate but also that he then 
asked Assange to pick between the two terms (Cohen & Stelter, 2010). Later, a Times op-
ed deemed Assange an activist rather than a journalist and criticized him for “muddying 
the water” between the two (Exum, 2010, para. 16). Likewise, a Washington Post 
columnist staked out a distinct line between activists like WikiLeaks and journalists, 
though he did not define it: “The difference between Wikileaks and the work of 
muckrakers is the difference between activists and journalists. I'm not arguing that every 
journalist's motives are as pure as the driven snow, but there is indeed a difference” 
(Robinson, 2010a, para. 13). Numerous other examples of this dichotomy abounded 
(Crovitz, 2011; Gross, 2010a; Kurtz, 2010d; Robinson, 2010b); WikiLeaks, as 
professional journalists set up the options, could choose to be either a news organization 
or an activist organization; choosing the latter shut itself out from consideration as the 
former. 
The provocative title and packaging of the WikiLeaks’ April 2010 video release 
“Collateral Murder” was by far the most-used piece of evidence for the claim that 
WikiLeaks’ activism was impeding its journalistic effectiveness. The Times’ Bill Keller 
(2011a) referred to it as “a work of antiwar propaganda,” its title as “tendentious,” and its 
editing as “manipulated” (para. 6), claiming it was that video in particular that alerted the 
Times to WikiLeaks’ differing agenda (Gross, 2011). A Wall Street Journal column, too, 
said the video was deceptively edited and revealed WikiLeaks’ true mission (Kirchick, 
2010). To defenders of the professional journalistic paradigm, the Collateral Murder 
video was the smoking gun that provided the evidence that WikiLeaks was definitively 
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outside the paradigm of objectivity. Once it was outside that paradigm, the credibility of 
its work was immediately thrown into question. Speaking on CNN, conservative blogger 
Erick Erickson drew a straight line between the editing of Collateral Murder and the lack 
of credibility of any of WikiLeaks’ subsequent releases (Sanchez, Yellin, & Baldwin, 
2010). Other commentators made the point without explicit reference to Collateral 
Murder, warning the public and the news media to examine WikiLeaks’ releases with a 
skeptical eye because it had expressed a political point of view (Sanchez et al., 2010; J. 
King, 2010a).  
The perceived damage to credibility done by WikiLeaks’ expression of a political 
purpose was strong enough that professional journalists both within and outside the Times 
and Guardian expressed concern those publications’ credibility as a result of their 
association with WikiLeaks (e.g., “WikiLeaks ‘Bastards,’” 2010). Several Times 
journalists were asked by other news outlets whether they were concerned about being 
tied to WikiLeaks’ agenda—a question that implied that WikiLeaks’ unobjective 
approach was damaging enough to taint someone’s reputation merely by association—
and got varying answers. While one Times reporter said WikiLeaks’ agenda could not 
defined in simple left-and-right terms (Whitfield et al., 2010b), Keller and another 
reporter referred to WikiLeaks’ views in the context of a reporter-source relationship, 
emphasizing the need to distance oneself from a source’s views while using its 
information (Kurtz, 2010b, 2010c). Keller made the point most directly in resisting the 
description of WikiLeaks’ relationship with the Times as a collaboration because the term 
“suggests some shared purpose” (Folkenflik, 2010). In a sense, Keller was describing the 
need for his paradigm repair: He and the rest of the professional news media were 
concerned that in seeing WikiLeaks work closely with professional journalists, the public 
would perceive that two shared some deeper paradigmatic similarities. In Keller’s view, 
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there were no such similarities, and through the public performance of paradigm repair 
and boundary work, he intended to persuade the public of that as well. 
Objectivity was also the key area of paradigm repair for the conservative 
alternative media, converging with the professional media in its basic elements but 
differing sharply in its conclusions. Like the professional news media, commentators in 
the conservative alternative media were primarily occupied with presenting Assange and 
WikiLeaks as anti-American and even sworn enemies of the United States. Both the 
Daily Caller and Big Government/Big Journalism repeatedly characterized Assange as 
someone who was driven primarily by a desire to embarrass the United States and aid its 
enemies (Tata, 2010; Treacher, 2010). They also used similar military language to the 
commentators in the professional news media, like “act of political warfare” and “enemy 
of the state” (Tata, 2010, para. 3; Yates & Whiton, 2010, para. 1)—though it should be 
noted that much of this sort of language that appeared in the professional news media 
also came from conservative columnists (e.g., Stephens, 2010; Thiessen, 2010a). Unlike 
in the professional news media, there was almost no discussion in the conservative media 
about whether WikiLeaks’ political objectives precluded it from performing journalism; 
the fact that it was anti-American was enough of an indictment against the group that the 
question of whether it was journalistic need not even be considered. 
The most telling difference between the conservative alternative media’s and the 
professional news media’s objectivity paradigms regarding WikiLeaks was in 
WikiLeaks’ relationship to the professional news media. For mainstream professional 
journalists, WikiLeaks’ eschewal of objectivity was reason to limit contact with it, for 
fear of losing credibility by association. But for the conservative alternative media, 
WikiLeaks’ association with mainstream news organizations was a major reason it was 
perceived as unobjective and not credible in the first place. The argument was expressed 
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well in a Daily Caller column in which thinktank executives Stephen Yates and Christian 
Whiton (2010) presented WikiLeaks’ association with mainstream publications as 
evidence of his anti-Americanism: 
The Guardian (London), Der Spiegel (Hamburg) and the New York Times are 
three key pillars of the Left intelligentsia and consistent opponents of a strong U.S. 
foreign policy and national defense. They want an America constrained by self-doubt and 
able to act abroad only with an international permission slip. This is an agenda 
presumably shared by Mr. Assange, with whom the organizations allied in this matter 
(para.  2). 
For Yates and Whiton, the primary evidence for WikiLeaks’ lack of objectivity 
was not necessarily anything the organization itself had done, but its association with 
other professional news organizations it considered unobjective. For the professional 
news media, questionable credibility began with WikiLeaks and flowed to professional 
journalists through its associations with them; for conservatives, those credibility 
concerns went in the opposite direction, starting with professional journalists and tainting 
WikiLeaks by association. A similar point was made in a Big Journalism column (Swift, 
2010), and elsewhere conservative writers focused their attacks regarding objectivity 
almost exclusively on WikiLeaks’ professional media collaborators, ignoring WikiLeaks 
itself (Crowley, 2010; Geller, 2010). To these writers, it seemed, WikiLeaks was 
relatively unknown and unimportant, unlike the news outlets with which it collaborated, 
whose lack of objectivity was seen as very certain and highly damaging. 
The centrality of the objectivity paradigm in the conservative alternative media’s 
discussion of WikiLeaks is striking, and perhaps quite revealing. Even though members 
of the professional media may not see conservative media as part of their objectivity 
paradigm, that paradigm appears to be extremely important to conservatives—perhaps, 
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relative to other areas of the journalistic paradigm, even more important than it is to 
professional journalists themselves. The difference between the two groups’ paradigmatic 
conception of objectivity is that, quite simply, each group considers themselves to be 
practicing objectivity and the other to be failing to do so. Though there is not enough 
evidence from the sample examined in this study to draw conclusions, the two groups 
seemed to have somewhat different definitions of objectivity, as  the dominant value in 
objectivity for conservatives seemed to be patriotism, while for professional journalists it 
was neutrality. More than the definitions, though, the two groups disagreed (quite 
strongly) on who was practicing it properly; professional journalists believed they were 
doing so (in fact, that they were able to define the norm), but conservatives believed 
those journalists were merely using objectivity as a cover for ideological leftism. They 
both agreed on one thing regarding their objectivity paradigms, however: there was no 
room for WikiLeaks within either of them.  
Resistance to the Objectivity Paradigm 
WikiLeaks’ own statements about its mission and methods during this time were 
complex and, at first glance, even contradictory. While Assange’s writings around the 
time of WikiLeaks’ founding were widely cited in objectivity discourse as proof of 
WikiLeaks’ anarchist agenda in opposition to governments (e.g., Carr, 2010; Crovitz, 
2010c; Sexton, 2010), his statements after that point—particularly in 2010—were much 
more ambiguous. At times, Assange seemed to articulate a goal of undermining regimes 
of secrecy, saying at a June 2010 forum that WikiLeaks was going after the foundation of 
secrecy on which institutions rest, something that was “inherently an anarchist act” 
(Hendler, 2010b, para. 12). But Assange also advocated an approach that is based in the 
scientific notion of objectivity, in which information is used to test claims and then form 
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conclusions (Boudana, 2011; Ryan, 2009). He told one Guardian reporter, for example, 
that journalism should be more like science, driven by verifiable facts, insisting that “he 
is neither of the right nor the left—his enemies are forever trying to pin labels on him in 
order to undermine his organisation. What matters first and foremost is getting the 
information out. ‘First the facts, ma’am,’ is how he summarises his philosophy to me” 
(Moss, 2010, para. 17). On the whole, it seems that Assange’s approach is dedicated to 
achieving scientific objectivity as a process through transparency, with an ultimate goal 
and guiding principle of challenging secrecy and exposing injustice. This distinction is 
evident in such statements by Assange as, “Our goal is just reform. Our method is 
transparency, but we do not put the method before the goal” (Snow et al., 2010). 
According to Beckett & Ball (2012), Assange believes that the fact that WikiLeaks 
objectively presents its source material is precisely what allows it make conclusions and 
advocate for action based on that material. 
This philosophy differs sharply from the strategic objectivity of professional 
journalism, in which objectivity serves as both a method and an end in itself. Yet it had a 
fair number of defenders, especially within the liberal alternative media. Within the 
professional news media, one primary means of defending WikiLeaks’ approach was by 
contending that while its views were extreme, that did not make its methods dishonest. 
For example, an early Washington Post profile noted that WikiLeaks showed a history of 
publishing leaks outside of those that fit with its particular viewpoint (Warrick, 2010), 
and a reporter at a White House press conference after the Afghanistan leaks badgered 
Press Secretary Robert Gibbs about why he was implying that WikiLeaks’ political views 
had anything to do with the accuracy of the documents it released (Velshi, Robertson, 
Boulden, & Rivers, 2010). Through statements like these, journalists were reaffirming the 
paradigm of objectivity while also allowing WikiLeaks inside it. 
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By contrast, the primary means in the liberal alternative media of defending 
WikiLeaks against objectivity repair was to defend WikiLeaks’ political goals 
themselves, presenting them as commendable, or least reasonable. This perspective could 
be found on rare occasions in the professional media, through guest commentators or 
columnists noting the value of the transparency for which WikiLeaks was working 
(Chatterjee, 2010; L. King, 2010; Kurtz, 2010c). But for the most part, it was expounded 
in the liberal alternative media—led, once again, by Salon’s Glenn Greenwald, who 
described WikiLeaks’ function as “unique and incomparably valuable” (2010d, para. 32) 
and repeatedly urged readers to their defense as one of the few groups effectively fighting 
government secrecy and keeping powerful bodies from conducting their business in the 
dark (2010a, 2010c, 2010d, 2010f). Other liberal media outlets were mixed on the value 
of this purpose (e.g., Marshall, 2010; Drum, 2010), but it found no support in the 
conservative media. 
Finally, in only a few cases, journalists and commentators defended WikiLeaks 
by attacking the objectivity paradigm itself. In the Online Journalism Review, journalism 
professor Robert Niles (2010) argued that all journalists are looking out for someone’s 
interests, whether it’s their readers, their sources, or themselves: “if you have a problem 
with the fact that Assange has a motivation, I suggest that you might just want to take a 
look in the mirror, first. All journalists are motivated by some agenda in their reporting. 
Or, at least, they'd better be” (para. 10-11, emphasis in original). And at Salon, 
Greenwald argued implicitly against the objectivity norm in his condemnation of 
journalists’ servile behavior to those in power (2010f, 2010g, 2010j), while another 
author made the historical case that objectivity has never been crucial to journalism 
(Gant, 2010). Nonetheless, discourse directly criticizing the objectivity paradigm was 
rare. Instead, the threat to the objectivity paradigm came not from discourse about it, but 
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from WikiLeaks’ acting as both activist and journalist, blurring the boundary between 
two realms journalists had considered distinct. Professional journalists had difficulties 
keeping that boundary clear through their discourse about WikiLeaks, but they did 
manage to maintain a tenuous hold on the legitimacy of the paradigm itself.  
In each of these four areas, WikiLeaks threatened the journalistic paradigm by 
revealing its fundamental inconsistencies; it raised tensions about what it means to be a 
journalist that the professional news media were never fully able to resolve. Yet it proved 
useful in highlighting the differences in perspective on what exactly the journalistic 
paradigm entailed, depending on one’s location within, at the margins of, or outside the 
paradigm itself. The concluding chapter will explore the implications of this encounter 
with WikiLeaks, both in illuminating the contours of the paradigm and evaluating its 
viability in a networked journalistic age. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
As a whole, the members of the professional news media vigorously attempted to 
repair their paradigm and re-establish their boundaries in response to the multifaceted 
challenge posed by WikiLeaks. They portrayed WikiLeaks as deviant and reinforced their 
own authority to establish and exemplify journalistic norms in a variety of ways, 
emphasizing the group’s instability, political radicalism, and relative lack of verification 
procedures while contrasting them with their own adherence to established journalistic 
practices. But discourse also varied in significant ways between news organizations 
within those general themes, helping reveal a more detailed map of the contours of 
professional journalism, in addition to the general outline provided in the last chapter. 
This final chapter will begin by locating each of the groups studied in relation to the 
professional journalistic paradigm, then follow with a discussion of the limitations of the 
study and its implications for future encounters between traditional professional 
journalism and new, networked forms of news. 
LOCATING ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE JOURNALISTIC PARADIGM 
Nearest to the center of the paradigm of professional journalism in this case was 
the New York Times. The paper led the way in professional journalism’s paradigm repair 
in every area, first establishing many of the themes of discourse regarding WikiLeaks and 
then continuing to voice them more forcefully and insistently than any other news 
organization. This may not necessarily indicate that the Times holds more tightly to the 
journalistic paradigm than any other American news organization, though it certainly 
showed a strong loyalty to many areas of the paradigm here. Instead, the Times likely 
responded most vociferously because it, among all media outlets, was most directly 
implicated in the challenge. The Times was the only American news organization to work 
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closely with WikiLeaks in 2010 and the only one to co-publish its major leaks. That 
meant it was the only news organization to face the paradox discussed in the opening 
chapter—how to simultaneously make use of WikiLeaks’ valuable information and also 
distance itself from the group. Other professional news organizations were only 
associated with WikiLeaks tangentially, by virtue of its claiming the journalistic mantle 
and performing journalistic activities; the Times, on the other hand, was connected to 
WikiLeaks directly and quite practically. Likewise, the Times’ repair and boundary work 
was tinged throughout with personal distaste. While Assange was almost a mythic, iconic 
figure for others, he was for the Times a real, regular presence with concrete behaviors, 
mannerisms, and effects on its operation, and the often personal nature of its discourse 
regarding him reflected that reality. 
The Times was the only news organization whose repair extended beyond the 
opinion pages to be performed in the news pages in almost equal measure. While news 
stories in other news organizations were written in a relatively straightforward tone with 
only occasional instances of overt repair, the Times’ stories were laced with language that 
indicated skepticism of WikiLeaks’ legitimacy. This was likely a measure of the intensity 
of its desire to distance itself from WikiLeaks, as well as its particular pervasiveness 
throughout the organization. While the Times certainly defended each area of the 
paradigm studied, it was less vigorous in its articulation of objectivity, though other news 
organizations were also relatively unenthusiastic in their defense of objectivity, so the 
Times was not necessarily far from the center of that paradigmatic dimension, either. In 
all, through both the boldness of its statements and their broad reach among other news 
organizations, the Times was reaffirmed as the key institution in communicating 
American journalism’s professional ideology. 
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The Washington Post and Wall Street Journal echoed the Times’ repair in many 
areas, clearly acting not as leaders, but followers in professional journalism’s process of 
ideological self-conception. Though the papers voiced the arguments of paradigm as 
strenuously as—or more strenuously than—the Times, they generally did so after the 
Times had initially raised each point. And unlike the Times, both papers’ repair was 
largely limited to editorials and op-ed columns; little of the dismissive language there 
slipped into the papers’ news coverage, unlike at the Times. It is difficult to determine 
whether this divergence reflects a substantive difference between the papers’ 
paradigmatic perspective or simply the result of the Post’s and the Journal’s lack of 
direct connection with WikiLeaks. Though the Journal’s editorial page more closely 
resembled the conservative media’s paradigmatic perspective in some areas (particularly 
objectivity), both the Post and Journal seemed to occupy a similar, if less influential, 
paradigmatic position as the Times. 
The broadcast news organizations surveyed in this study, CNN and NPR, were 
not as firmly pinned to many of the aspects of the journalistic paradigm as the 
newspapers studied. The two outlets contained a surprising breadth of opinion regarding 
WikiLeaks and the legitimacy of journalistic norms, much broader than any of the 
American newspapers. That opinion was generally weighted toward maintenance of the 
journalistic paradigm, though it included a substantial amount of defense of WikiLeaks 
countering that paradigm. NPR in particular performed very little paradigm repair; its 
discourse contained relatively little language or tone that characterized WikiLeaks as 
illegitimate, irrational, or outside the bounds of journalism. Most of what repair did exist 
on its airwaves came from representatives of the New York Times who were interviewed 
on its shows. In fact, most of the opinion on these particular broadcast outlets (as opposed 
to others like Fox News and MSNBC) comes from representatives from other 
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organizations, so while they maintain ultimate control over their communication of their 
journalistic ideology, that communication is also subject to more influence from other 
news organizations. Thus, while these organizations are not necessarily less directed by 
the journalistic paradigm in their editorial processes, their performance of that paradigm 
in public is less emphatic than in other professional news organizations. This difference 
indicates a subtle but significant distinction between the degree to which an organization 
is ruled by a paradigm and the degree to which that organization performs and defends 
that paradigm in public view. Strong identification with a professional paradigm will 
typically entail a strong public expression of that paradigm, but this is not always a 
necessary outcome. 
As we move outward from the center of the paradigm of American professional 
journalism, the first significant divergence from the paradigm—rather than simply a lack 
of active defense of the paradigm—can be found in professional media criticism. This 
field straddled the boundary between professional and alternative media, at times 
defending professional media’s usefulness and the continued viability of its paradigm, 
and at other times directly and indirectly challenging the supremacy of the norms within 
the journalistic field. Part of this dissension is a function of the fact that this field gives 
significant space to voices from academia, who are more free from the institutional and 
routinized strictures of journalism to critique the profession. Professional media critics 
issued particularly vocal defenses of institutionality and original reporting, while being 
more inclined to challenge the norms of reporter-source relationships and objectivity. 
This could be a result of the novelty of the former two areas as challenges to professional 
journalism. That is to say, the latter values have been the subject of scrutiny for a long 
enough time to have coherent challenges built up against them, while the former have 
largely been unarticulated areas of the journalistic paradigm because so few viable 
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challenges against them have been mounted. Additionally, the former values, particularly 
institutionality, are the values that allow those professional media critics to be 
professionalized as well, so there may be an element of self-defense to the discourse 
about those values as well. 
The liberal alternative media shared less of the American professional journalistic 
paradigm than any other group studied. It largely defended WikiLeaks on every front, 
though its discourse regarding objectivity was rarer and less vigorous than any other area. 
Liberal media organizations did acknowledge some caveats in their support of 
WikiLeaks, voicing their disapproval of certain aspects of WikiLeaks’ behavior while 
defending it in other areas. Mother Jones was particularly strong in its criticism of 
WikiLeaks; at times, its discourse was virtually indistinguishable from that of mainstream 
professional journalism. While it is difficult to ascertain precisely what paradigm the 
liberal alternative media held because it was not challenged in this particular case, this 
group clearly operated outside the professional journalistic paradigm, with little regard 
for the ways in which professional journalists articulated their norms of institutionality 
and proper reporter-source relationships and reporting processes. 
The conservative alternative media were more difficult to place than any other 
group in the study, as they were both vehemently opposed to the mainstream journalistic 
paradigm and skeptical of WikiLeaks’ networked model as well. Their attacks on 
WikiLeaks were just as virulent as professional journalists’, but they were based more on 
political grounds than journalistic ones. Objectivity was by far the most significant area 
of repair for conservative journalists and commentators, but even that area did not 
constitute a paradigmatic intersection with professional journalism. On objectivity and 
the other paradigmatic aspects studied, conservative media displayed more disgust with 
the “mainstream media” paradigm than with WikiLeaks itself. It is difficult to determine 
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whether their distaste for Assange’s political views clouded their view of the viability of 
WikiLeaks’ networked model; a (not necessarily feasible) hypothetical organization with 
similar structure and characteristics but a conservative political aim might have drawn 
much more support from the conservative alternative media. 
The final organization surveyed in this study, the Guardian, operates within a 
different paradigm than the others—the British, or European, professional journalistic 
paradigm. This paradigm was much more sympathetic toward WikiLeaks, displaying a 
rare desire to understand the group before attacking it (though this impression may be 
partly aided by the fact that the Guardian’s full falling-out with WikiLeaks came in 
September 2011 upon after the release of all 250,000 diplomatic cables [Gunter, 2011], 
after the period covered in this study).  The Guardian’s repair did indicate some overlap 
between the British and American journalistic paradigms, especially regarding the 
centrality of institutionality and original reporting. Still, the American sense of 
journalistic objectivity that WikiLeaks violated was not a fundamental part of the 
Guardian’s paradigm, and its reporter-source relationships were not threatened in this 
particular case. Based on its response to the challenge of WikiLeaks’ approach, it appears 
that the British journalistic paradigm, as represented by the Guardian, is better equipped 
to address and adapt to the networked journalism era. 
The discourse examined in this study also provides a glimpse of the 
complementary workings of paradigm repair and boundary work in professional 
journalism’s efforts to reinforce its professional ideology and separate itself from 
WikiLeaks’ networked model. In this case, paradigm repair and boundary work were part 
of the same process of distancing and reinforcement, often acting in tandem, but with 
each emerging as especially important in certain facets of discourse. Boundary work 
addressed more of the fundamental definitional questions involved with WikiLeaks—
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none more fundamental than, “Is WikiLeaks journalism?” This led it to be central in the 
distancing process when issues related to original reporting were discussed. Boundary 
work’s principal function was to set up a divide between “journalism” and “not-
journalism” and ensure that WikiLeaks and the professional news media were kept on 
opposite sides of that divide, keeping journalism’s professional boundaries protected.  
Paradigm repair, on the other hand, was employed largely in the form of more 
personal attacks against WikiLeaks. Its purpose was to depict WikiLeaks as an unreliable, 
unstable, malicious actor that did not share in the journalistic paradigm, and to reaffirm 
the ability of the journalistic profession to guard against such bad actors. Because of this 
emphasis on WikiLeaks’ isolation and journalism’s structural advantages in rooting out 
deviance, paradigm repair manifested itself most clearly in discourse surrounding 
institutionality, but it was also present throughout the discourse about WikiLeaks. 
Through paradigm repair, journalists sought to portray WikiLeaks as a single, rogue 
actor, which at times played well to WikiLeaks’ eccentricities. Yet as professional 
journalism runs up against more networked journalistic actors in the future, it will find 
itself less and less able to isolate them as deviant actors. Instead, boundary work may 
play a more prominent role in professional journalistic discourse regarding networked 
journalism as a full-fledged ideological competitor rather than a lone paradigm violator. 
LIMITATIONS 
While this study included a large sample of a broad range of publications, it still 
only examines a single case, and like all case studies, it is limited in its generalizability. 
First, it is important not to generalize too broadly within the case itself, as large news 
organizations can be sites of significant ideological variety and dispute. Some of the 
people who voiced paradigm repair most strongly in this case were columnists such as the 
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Washington Post’s Marc Thiessen and the Wall Street Journal’s Gabriel Schoenfeld who 
are not physically (or possibly even socially) located within the organizations themselves 
and whose ideological views do not necessarily represent the organizations as a whole. 
However, the majority of the repair and boundary work came from a broad range of 
locations within the news organizations, both more and less institutional—from editorials 
and editor’s essays to blogs, podcasts, on-air interviews, and news articles. While 
individual instances of repair work should not be misunderstood as proxies for an 
organization’s perspective, the similarity of themes across a spectrum of institutional 
locations points toward a reasonably generalizable perspective among the organizations 
studied. 
Second, this case’s external generalizability is also limited, partly because of the 
intrinsic nature of case studies and partly because of the particularities of WikiLeaks as a 
case, which is not a perfect case. Its editorial and organizational direction as well as its 
relationships with government and the media have been abnormally influenced by 
Assange’s reportedly volatile personality and regrettable personal choices. This may be a 
case of personal characteristics adversely affecting journalistic outcomes, though that 
phenomenon is not limited to WikiLeaks, of course. As Beckett and Ball (2012) note, 
there are plenty of egotists in professional newsrooms who are difficult to work with, 
though their personal traits are often shielded from impacting their organizations by 
institutional structures. Assange’s personal abrasiveness also led to a significant amount 
of personally oriented criticism, which can be difficult to parse from the more 
paradigmatically significant professional criticism. Yet even the personal criticism has 
latent meaning, especially when it is tied to professional dimensions of behavior, as we 
saw most clearly in the repair work regarding institutionality. Also, personal distaste does 
not necessarily bleed into repair work, as we saw happen within the professional news 
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media. The liberal alternative media showed how to register misgivings about WikiLeaks 
on a personal level while also defending its larger principles, which indicates that the 
repair work documented within the professional media is not necessarily fueled by mere 
personal dislike. 
WikiLeaks also made some highly questionable decisions in its handling of 
documents, particularly in its refusal to redact the names of informants and other 
vulnerable individuals in its Afghanistan document release. It could be posited that the 
repair work was simply an appropriate response to these specific misdeeds, rather than to 
WikiLeaks’ status as an emergent practitioner of a new form of networked journalism. 
There was indeed a significant amount of repair devoted to these specific actions, though 
the repair and boundary work went well beyond that area, touching on almost area of 
WikiLeaks’ existence, many of which had little or nothing to do with its decisions 
regarding redaction or document security. If repair work had been limited to those 
decisions, we might conclude that it was specific to WikiLeaks as a case. But since the 
repair itself touched on much broader issues, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
professional news media were responding to WikiLeaks as part of a broader challenge as 
well. 
PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISM AND THE NETWORKED ERA OF NEWS 
More than WikiLeaks itself, this study is concerned with the interactions between 
professional and networked journalism and the paradigmatic interplay between the two 
domains. In WikiLeaks, the professional news media encountered a radically networked 
news organization, one which possessed many of the qualities that distinguishes 
networked journalism from its professional counterpart: decentralized structure, open 
advocacy, organization around networks rather than institutions, and transparency as an 
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orienting value. But WikiLeaks also resembled professional journalism in several key 
ways, dealing with one of the oldest forms of journalistic information in leaks and 
processing information editorially and disseminating it widely (Beckett & Ball, 2012). 
Thus, WikiLeaks presented a radically new networked model for journalism, but one that 
also overlapped significantly with the traditional professional journalistic model. 
This type of overlap is not uncommon in interactions between professional and 
networked journalism; these two spheres are not separate, but are instead adopting many 
of each other’s characteristics as they come in contact with each other. Networked 
journalistic actors such as political bloggers and citizen-driven content sites have moved 
toward professionalized practices in recent years (Kim, 2012; Lowrey, Parrott, & Meade, 
2011), and professional journalists have—somewhat begrudgingly—begun to incorporate 
more open, networked approaches into their journalistic practices (Anderson, 
forthcoming; Singer et al., 2011). The blurring of the boundaries between these two 
spheres inevitably produces some definitional and ideological ambiguity, and the 
WikiLeaks case threw those uncertainties into stark relief. In this case, as Benkler (2011, 
p. 44) pointed out, it was not feasible for journalists to separate their own work from 
Assange’s without also excluding some of the core pillars of networked journalism and 
the networked public sphere. So a confrontation with WikiLeaks such as the one in which 
professional journalism engaged was also a confrontation with the larger networked 
model of journalism, one in which attitudes toward that model were revealed alongside 
attitudes about WikiLeaks. 
WikiLeaks has shown a great amount of instability during its short existence, and 
its cultural influence has waned significantly since its peak in late 2010. Assange remains 
under house arrest, and the alleged source of its four major leaks, Pfc. Bradley Manning, 
is in a military prison awaiting trial. WikiLeaks has severed ties with its largest media 
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partners, losing out on the global audiences they provided (though it is now working with 
a larger number of much smaller media partners [Heim, 2012]). As Beckett and Ball 
(2012) noted, WikiLeaks’ model is both far-reaching and uncertain enough that it could 
move into a number of journalistic and quasi-journalistic realms; as of early 2012, 
WikiLeaks seems to be moving away from networked journalistic aims, with Assange 
announcing plans for a talk show and an Australian Senate run (“Julian Assange to Run,” 
2012; “New Assange TV Series,” 2012). 
But WikiLeaks’ health and stability are not reliable indicators of the health and 
stability of networked journalism. WikiLeaks is merely a single pioneering organization 
in this field, and networked journalism is primed to continue to emerge with or without 
its success (Ludlow, 2010). As Beckett and Ball (2012) put it, “as with so many online 
innovators before it, WikiLeaks’ real significance may be what follows in its wake, rather 
than its short, turbulent history” (2). What is following is the movement of information 
through open, networked flows largely unbound by institutional authority or geographical 
boundaries (Beckett & Ball, 2012; Sifry, 2011a). WikiLeaks is not an aberration, but a 
harbinger; not a bug in the web, but a feature of it (Sifry, 2011b). 
The interactions between professional journalism and WikiLeaks, then, can be a 
useful indicator of how the traditional values of journalism might be changing (or 
remaining unchanged) in the face of the emergence of networked journalism. The 
discourse in this study suggests that at least one major change may be in the works: 
objectivity may be declining as a core tenet of professional journalistic ideology. 
Objectivity was clearly still a part of the journalistic paradigm in this discourse, but it was 
much less vigorously defended than the other paradigmatic elements that WikiLeaks 
challenged. WikiLeaks’ lack of objectivity was much less offensive to journalists than, 
say, its lack of institutionality. For journalists, this finding suggests that objectivity, once 
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considered the core of the journalistic paradigm (Meyers, 2011), is now no longer the 
central criterion for acceptance as part of professional journalism. Fox News, for 
example, does not practice what most professional journalists would consider objective 
journalism (e.g., Coe et al., 2008), yet it retains its place as part of the professional news 
media. Similarly, establishing WikiLeaks’ lack of objectivity was not enough to establish 
it as being outside the journalistic paradigm; others areas of deviance were far more 
important to its exclusion. The only field for which objectivity remained a critical 
paradigmatic dimension was the conservative media, suggesting that the fixation on 
objectivity may be becoming more strictly a function of a left-right, narrowly politically 
oriented approach to media, a sort of relic of the “culture wars” approach to media and 
politics. For conservatives, this suggests that their desire for journalistic objectivity is 
driven by a belief that political institutions are fundamentally liberal, and that by 
distancing themselves from those institutions via objectivity, journalists can better serve 
conservative interests. 
In its place, context is emerging as a significant source of journalistic authority. 
The professional journalistic case for credibility and authority over information 
dissemination seems to be shifting from a basis in the practice of objectivity to a basis in 
the process of understanding and placing information in context. This shift parallels the 
massive increase in the abundance of information in the networked era. As a response to 
this increase, journalists are recasting their own value in terms of helping audiences deal 
with the volume of information they encounter, rather than the philosophical method by 
which it is gathered. It is, in a way, professional journalism’s way of reacting against 
what they perceive as networked journalism’s “information overload.” 
Alternative media—particularly liberal media—seem to be particularly attuned to 
the realities of networked journalism and inclined to collaborate with or incorporate it. 
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This stands to reason, as many of these organizations, including Talking Points Memo 
and Salon in this study, were part of the alternative digitally based model of journalism 
that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s as a forerunner to the networked 
journalism model. This history has given those organizations the structural fluidity and 
openness to change that is inhibited by the large institutions that populate the professional 
journalistic field. This study revealed pockets of such openness at traditional news 
organizations, but it also showed that the journalistic paradigm is still deeply embedded 
in the institutional mindset: The higher journalists were in the institutional hierarchy, the 
more vigorously they defended the journalistic paradigm. This certainly does not bode 
well for the continued innovation in and reinvention of professional journalism in the 
networked era, as it suggests the perpetuation of a culture of resistance to change within 
journalism institutions. 
Novelty certainly does not entail improvement, and many of the principles of the 
journalistic paradigm may indeed still prove especially valuable in the age of networked 
journalism. But the values of networked journalism must be taken seriously by 
journalists, too—understood, evaluated, and if necessary, incorporated into their 
journalistic framework. In many cases regarding WikiLeaks, this sort of considered 
reflection was replaced by a reactionary dismissal that may have served a rhetorical 
function but did little to adapt the philosophy or practice of journalism to the networked 
nature of the web. As more news organizations follow WikiLeaks’ model, straddling the 
lines between traditional journalistic functions and a more open approach, the degree to 
which these networked principles are considered and employed will become an 
increasingly important marker of professional journalism’s future course. Either the 
traditional journalistic paradigm will shift and open itself up to new models for 
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journalism practice, or it will remain rigid and thus cut off a wide range of innovative, 
vibrant journalistic actors from its purview. 
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